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In an earlier article,1 Professor Norwood questioned the wis-
dom of the Supreme Court's decision in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,2
which allows plaintiffs to double forum-shop, i.e., to file a lawsuit in
one jurisdiction and then, while retaining the advantages of that
jurisdiction's laws, to transfer the lawsuit to the geographically pre-
ferred jurisdiction. There, Professor Norwood assumed that having
choices about where to file lawsuits was a necessary component of
America's judicial system. Below, however, Professor Norwood
explores that assumption and concludes that parties should not have
the unrestricted choices seemingly provided by most venue laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Shopping is one of America's favorite pastimes. We shop for cars,
homes, banks, investments, jobs, doctors, furniture, schools, clothes,
food, and thousands of other things. Before making our purchase, we
normally look at the same item in a variety of venues. But what role
should choice play in America's judicial system? Should one be able to
shop for a judge? To shop for juries? To choose the law that will apply
in the litigation? To decide in what state or in what court one's lawsuit
is to be filed? To forum-shop?
Forum-shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action
tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive
the most favorable judgment or verdict."3 At the broadest level, forum-
shopping includes liberal venue provisions, removal of cases by defend-
ants from state to federal court, joining (or not joining) parties to litiga-
tion, selecting juries as a whole, as well as individual jurors, and
shopping for judges. The term also includes choosing a particular venue
based upon favorable (or unfavorable) procedural and substantive laws,
judicial calendars, backlogs, and local rules.4 Although the language
contained in the clear majority of cases addressing forum-shopping
issues reflects contempt for forum-shopping, many of these decisions
actually promote and encourage forum-shopping, depending on the type
of forum-shopping involved. Two questions arise. First, why does our
judicial system generally favor certain types of forum-shopping over
others? Second, why are plaintiffs generally given so much deference in
their choice of forum?
Consider these questions in the context of the following illustration:
X tortiously injures Y. After securing an attorney, Y and her attorney
learn that a tort action may be filed against X in one of ten different
states-all where venue is proper and personal jurisdiction exists over
X. Y chooses to file her lawsuit in the state whose laws are most
favorable to her. Or suppose instead that Y chooses a jurisdiction
because juries in the chosen venue consistently render more plaintiff
verdicts and higher monetary damage awards than juries in the other
possible venues. As demonstrated below, most jurisdictions overwhelm-
ingly support these forms of forum-shopping as a party's right and as
valid tactical maneuvers.
The general view in favor of law-shopping and jury-shopping does
not exist with respect to judge-shopping. Judge-shopping is a party's
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See, e.g., Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1677, 1677-80 (1990).
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attempt to "manipulate the identity of the decision maker,"5 presumably
in one's favor. Using the above illustration, if Y attempted somehow to
choose the judge whom she believed would be most favorable to her
case, our judicial system would condemn this action because it impairs
the integrity of the judicial system and judicial process.
The first question, then, is why are law-shopping and jury-shopping
treated differently from judge-shopping? In other words, if shopping for
a judge is impermissible because such a policy would impair the integ-
rity of the judicial system, why aren't law-shopping and jury-shopping
impermissible for the same reason?
This Article explores why selections based on laws and juries are
allowed-and even encouraged-while selections based on judges are
not. This Article, in finding that the same policy reasons against judge-
shopping are also present with respect to law- and jury-shopping, then
addresses another question: Why are plaintiffs given such wide defer-
ence in their venue choices anyway? Indeed, as explored later, not only
does the deference given to the filing party's venue choice rests on false
foundations, but the judicial system's current approach to venue selec-
tion violates the purpose of venue. Specifically, while the primary pur-
pose of venue laws is to find a convenient place for the trial of a given
matter, most courts do not evaluate venue selections with this focus.
Rather, the typical court robotically pursues the list of possible venues in
the given venue law and shuts off when it discovers that the chosen
forum is a permissible venue option. But this approach is not correct.
The proper venue inquiry should focus on convenience. Once courts
begin to use convenience as the basis for all venue-selection decisions, a
party's ability to make filing decisions based on the location of
favorable juries or favorable laws will decrease.
This call to reevaluate venue requires only a change of viewpoint.
No new laws are required at either the federal or state level. The appro-
priate vehicles to institute reform are already at every court's disposal.
It is just a matter of getting judges to use them. In the federal system,
this suggestion would require more vigorous use of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. 6 Thus, if a Pennsylvania-based action is filed in
a Mississippi court by a Pennsylvania resident, the court should dismiss
the lawsuit under the common law doctrine on the ground that Missis-
5. Jones v. City of Buffalo, 867 F. Supp. 1155, 1163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Michael
Vitt, Shopping for Justice, MPLS. ST. PAUL MAO., Dec. 1983, at 127.
6. The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss matters,
without prejudice to the filing party, when it determines that another, more convenient forum
exists. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); see also BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 655
(6th ed. 1990).
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sippi is not a convenient forum for the trial of the Pennsylvania matter.7
State court judges saddled with litigation having little or no connection
with the chosen venue should do likewise. In cases where the state court
determines that another venue in a different state is more convenient, the
court should dismiss the lawsuit under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.8 Thus, if a Missouri-based action is filed in an Illinois court by
Missouri residents, the court should immediately consider dismissal.9
Moreover, even if the more convenient venue is located within the same
state, the current forum should either utilize any state transfer statutes to
transfer the litigation to the alternative forum,10 or dismiss the litigation
on forum non conveniens grounds. Thus, when a resident of one city
files a lawsuit in a different city in the same state, if the chosen city has
no connection with the plaintiff or the litigation, the current forum
should transfer or dismiss the lawsuit.I'
This suggestion is designed to put substantive restraints on venue
choices. It is designed to curtail the decision to file a lawsuit in a given
forum simply to secure a more favorable jury or more favorable laws. It
is designed to relieve forums of the burden of entertaining litigation with
which they have little or no connection. Finally, it is designed to close
the gaps in current interpretations of venue laws that allow virtually
unfettered choices on where a given lawsuit may be filed.
II. SHOPPING FOR LAWS AND JURIES
A. Examples of Venue-Shopping
"Venue" is defined as
[t]he particular county, or geographical area, in which a court with
jurisdiction may hear and determine a case. Venue deals with local-
ity of suit, that is, with question of which court, or courts, of those
that possess adequate personal and subject matter jurisdiction may
7. See infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text. The Article will also discuss more
vigorous use of the general federal transfer statute 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
8. The federal transfer statute is for use in the federal system only. A state court has no
power to transfer a case to a federal court. See, e.g., Bloom v. Fine, 653 A.2d 1292, 1294-55 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995). Nor can a state court transfer an action from one state court to a court in a
different state. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMEs, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE,
§ 2.31, at 107 (3d ed. 1985) ("The courts of one state ... may not transfer cases to courts of
another state, and dismissal is the only device for implementing forum non conveniens on an
interstate basis.") (footnote omitted); see also Norwood, supra note 1, at 548 n.269. Thus, state
courts determining that venue is more appropriate in either some federal forum or a state court
forum outside of the state must rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Virtually every
state recognizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See infra note 265.
9. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
10. Several states have laws allowing in-state transfers. See infra notes 263-64, 270.
11. See infra notes 57-81.
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hear the specific suit in question.' 2
Although venue is not a constitutional requirement, parties must comply
with applicable federal and state laws when identifying jurisdictions
where a lawsuit may be filed. Under the general federal venue statute,
for example, a lawyer wishing to file a federal diversity action knows
that there are at least three venues available:
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated,
or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district
in which the action may otherwise be brought.'"
Even though venue choices are often identical regardless of
whether a case is founded on federal question jurisdiction or federal
diversity jurisdiction,14 venue options often vary depending upon the
type of defendant involved.' Moreover, if the claim is a federal statu-
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1557 (6th ed. 1990).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (Supp. V 1993), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-34, 109 Stat. 293
(1995).
14. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) with the general federal venue provision controlling in
actions not founded solely on diversity. The latter, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides:
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the clan occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district, in which any defendant
may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Supp. V 1993).
15. For example, actions against "aliens" may be brought in "any district." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(d) (1988). Actions against officers or employees, in their official capacity, or agencies of
the United States may be brought in:
any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if
no real property is involved in the action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (Supp. V 1993). Actions against foreign states, as defined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a), may be brought in:
(1) in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject
of the action is situated;
(2) in any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated,
if the claim is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title;
(3) in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do
business or is doing business, if the action is brought against an agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of this title; or
(4) in the United State District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is
brought against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1988). Another section, 28 U.S.C. 1391(c) (1988), defines the residence of
corporate defendants for venue purposes.
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tory one, the statute giving rise to the action might contain its own venue
provision. 16 Finally, if a state law action is filed in state court, the par-
ticular state's venue statutes and/or court rules control. 17  Once the
options become clear, the lawyer must then make his or her selection.'"
In making the where-to-file decision, the lawyer-normally the
plaintiff's lawyer, because the plaintiff normally is the filing party-
takes many factors into account. For example, venue choices are often
based on: the party's geographical convenience; preference for judges
in the chosen jurisdiction; preference for the substantive and/or proce-
dural laws in a given venue; the belief that the potential jurors in a par-
ticular jurisdiction are more receptive to the filing party's position; and
comparisons between the trial calendars (and/or backlogs) in the various
venues. 19 Examples of some of these factors at work are described
below.
1. USING VENUE RULES AND TRANSFER STATUTES TO SECURE BOTH
MORE FAVORABLE LAWS AND MORE FAVORABLE
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
In Ferens v. John Deere Co.,20 the plaintiffs, husband and wife,
16. For example, for claims brought under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988), the applicable venue provision provides in part:
Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to
enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any
such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business ....
15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West Supp. 1995). This type of venue statute is known as a "special," as
opposed to a "general," venue provision. It is clear that whenever a special venue provision covers
particular kinds of actions, the special provisions control over the general venue statute. See, e.g.,
Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 92 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D. Cal.
1950), mandamus denied, 185 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1950).
17. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 508 (1994).
18. As explored infra notes 309-16 and accompanying text, the ethics rules governing
attorney conduct typically require attorneys to "act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1995). Thus, venue selections normally are made with
the client's best interest in mind. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIxILxTY,
Canon 7 (1983); see, e.g., Brian R. Opeskin, The Price of Forum Shopping: A Reply to Professor
Juenger, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 14, 27 (1994) ("Few would argue with the proposition that lawyers
are ethically bound to advise their clients of the best forum in which to present their case.").
19. Consider also the attorney's own financial interest if venue in a particular jurisdiction
cannot be secured. The client may take the case to another attorney.
20. 494 U.S. 516 (1990). Ferens has been analyzed elsewhere. See, e.g., Norwood, supra
note 1; George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't A Conservative
Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REy. 649 (1993); David E. Seidelson, I (Wortman) + 1
(Ferens) = 6 (Years): That Can 't Be Right-Can It? Statutes of Limitations and Supreme Court
Inconsistency, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 787 (1991); Candace J. Smith, Plaintiff-Initiated Transfers
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filed two diversity actions-each based upon the same injury-producing
event-in different federal courts against the same corporate defend-
ant.21 The first action, based on breach of contract and warranty claims,
was filed in Pennsylvania, the state of plaintiffs' residence and also
where the injury occurred.22 Because the statute of limitations on d tort
claim had expired under Pennsylvania law, the second diversity action
was filed in Mississippi, where the applicable tort statute of limitations
had not expired. 3 Plaintiffs were able to secure personal jurisdiction
over the defendant in Mississippi because the defendant was licensed to
do business there.24 The Mississippi action was filed notwithstanding
that: (1) plaintiffs resided in Pennsylvania; (2) the product was
purchased in Pennsylvania; (3) the injury occurred in Pennsylvania; (4)
the defendant did business in Pennsylvania; (5) all of the witnesses with
any knowledge of either the accident or the injuries were in Penn-
sylvania; (6) all of the documents relating to the injuries were in Penn-
sylvania; (7) a related action was then pending in Pennsylvania; (8)
Mississippi had no connection with the lawsuit; and (9) pursuing both
actions simultaneously in different states would be highly inconvenient
to the parties and witnesses. 25 Days after filing the second action in
Mississippi, plaintiffs requested and received a transfer of the Missis-
sippi lawsuit to Pennsylvania, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), for the con-
venience of the parties and witnesses.2 6 Plaintiffs hoped that upon
transfer Mississippi's longer tort statute of limitations would follow
them back to Pennsylvania. 7
Once in Pennsylvania, the federal district court there and the Third
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)-The Solution to the Van Dusen v. Barrack Mystery: Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 19 N. Ky. L. REv. 171 (1991); Ursula M. Henninger, Note, The Plaintiff's Forum
Shopping Gold Card: Choice of Law in Federal Courts After Transfer of Venue Under Section
1404(a)-Ferens v. John Deere Co., 26 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 809 (1991); Stowell R.R. Kelner,
Note, "Adrift on an Uncharted Sea ": A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal
System, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612 (1992); Christopher C. Osborne, Note, The Applicable Law in
Federal Court After Transfer of Venue by Plaintff Ferens v. John Deere Co., 24 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 397 (1990); Michael B. Rodden, Comment, Is 28 US.C. § 1404(a) a Federal Forum-
Shopping Statute?, 66 WASH. L. Rev. 851 (1991).
21. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423, 424 (3d Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 487
U.S. 1212, aff'd, 862 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1988), and rev'd sub nom. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494
U.S. 516 (1990).
25. Ferens v. Deere & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff 'd on other grounds, 819
F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988), aff'd, 862 F.2d 31 (3d
Cir. 1988), and rev'd sub nom. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
26. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 520. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. V 1993) provides: "For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
27. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 520.
1996]
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Circuit resisted plaintiffs' attempt to transport Mississippi's favorable
statute of limitations law to Pennsylvania.28 The district court, relying
on the specific language of section 1404(a), found that the Mississippi
action could not have been brought in Pennsylvania because the latter's
statute of limitations had expired 29 and that the " 'interest of justice'
would be thwarted rather than served if. . . this type of 'legal foot-
work' " was permitted. 0 The Third Circuit also rejected plaintiffs' law-
shopping attempt, initially concluding that Mississippi could not consti-
tutionally apply its longer limitations period to an action with no con-
nection to Mississippi.31 After reconsideration of this holding in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,32 the Third
Circuit ultimately rejected plaintiffs' law-shopping attempt on the
ground that it would violate earlier Supreme Court prohibitions against
forum-shopping.33
In the Supreme Court, however, plaintiffs' law-shopping escapade
was rewarded.3 4  The Court did acknowledge the manipulative ploy
inherent in the plaintiffs' conduct.35 But it took an our-hands-are-tied
28. Id. at 520-21.
29. Ferens, 639 F. Supp. at 1491. Section 1404(a) requires a finding that the requested
transfer be "in the interest of justice."
30. Ferens, 639 F. Supp. at 1492 (quoting Mata v. Budd Co., 44 F.R.D. 225, 226-27 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
31. Ferens, 819 F.2d at 427.
32. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). Sun Oil involved the issue of whether a forum state with no
connection to the litigation could constitutionally apply its own longer statute of limitations to
matters whose substantive issues would be governed by the laws of another state. The Court
found that "the Constitution does not bar application of the forum State's statute of limitations to
claims that in their substance are and must be governed by the law of a different State." Id. at 722
(citations omitted).
33. Ferens, 862 F.2d 31, 35-36 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit stated:
[P]laintiffs are attempting to use § 1404(a) to forum shop. They are time-barred
from bringing their action in the state courts of Pennsylvania or directly in a
diversity action in the federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania. They hope to do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. They hope to use § 1404(a) and a brief stop
in Mississippi to achieve a result in the federal courts of Pennsylvania that they
could not achieve in the state courts of Pennsylvania.
See also Ferens, 639 F. Supp. at 1491, where the district court stated:
The fact that Plaintiffs' original lawsuit in this District Court did not include the
claims which were time-barred under Pennsylvania law unequivocally establishes
that Plaintiffs were seeking to maneuver around this by intentionally filing a second
action in an inconvenient forum to avail themselves of that forum's longer statute of
limitations and its plaintiff-oriented borrowing statute. By filing a subsequent law-
suit in the Southern District of Mississippi to take advantage of that state's six-year
limitation period and then moving to transfer that action with their pending action in
this District Court for purposes of convenience, consolidation and efficiency, Plain-
tiffs are seeking the "best of both forums."
34. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519, 531-33.
35. Id. at 531.
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approach to the situation. After noting that plaintiffs have a congressio-
nally granted right to forum-shop even without the benefit of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a),36 the Court focused on the key purpose of section 1404(a):
Th[e] legislative background supports the view that § 1404(a) was
not designed to narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege or to defeat the
state-law advantages that might accrue from the exercise of this
venue privilege but rather the provision was simply to counteract the
inconveniences that flowed from the venue statutes by permitting
transfer to a convenient federal court.37
Thus, because plaintiffs had the right to file their noncontract action in
Mississippi, 38 because the federal court in Mississippi would apply Mis-
sissippi's longer statute of limitations to that action,39 and because sec-
tion 1404(a) does not authorize " 'a change of a law as a bonus for a
change of venue,' "40 the Court concluded that the laws of Mississippi
properly followed the plaintiffs back to Pennsylvania.
36. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 527-28. The statutory provision governing venue in diversity cases,
as it existed at the time Ferens was decided, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. V 1993), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-34, 109 Stat. 293 (1995), provided
in relevant part:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
This statute, as interpreted, guaranteed plaintiffs the right to file their lawsuit in any state where
the corporate defendant was, among other things, licensed to do business.
37. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 522 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)). The
quote concludes:
"We believe, therefore, that both the history and purposes of § 1404(a) indicate that
it should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the
placement of litigation in the federal courts and generally intended, on the basis of
convenience and fairness, simply to authorize a change of courtrooms."
Id. at 523 (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636-37).
38. Id. at 519.
39. Id. at 519-20; see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electronic Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941) (holding that in cases based on diversity jurisdiction, federal courts must apply the conflict
of laws principles of the state in which the district court sits).
40. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 522 (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636).
41. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519, 532; accord Muldoon v. Tropitone Furniture Co., 1 F.3d 964,
966 (9th Cir. 1993); Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 91-3779, 1992 WL 167030, at
*5 (E.D. La. June 30, 1992). In Frazier v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 163
(S.D. Miss. 1991), the court refused plaintiff's motion to transfer a case to the state of plaintiff's
residence (and the site of the injury). The request to transfer was denied only because plaintiff
waited too long before filing the request: When a party allows "a significant amount of time to
pass before the request to transfer is made, the forum court has had the opportunity to involve
itself in the management of the lawsuit and to familiarize itself with the issues presented by the
case." Id. at 167. Transferring at such a late stage, then, "would greatly diminish the value of the
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:267
2. JOINING PARTIES TO LITIGATION TO SECURE FAVORABLE JURIES
Ferens may be the most extreme example of the quest to obtain the
laws of choice.42 Notice, however, that another avenue was available
judicial resources that had so far been expended in the matter, since the forum court's familiarity
with the case would no longer be of benefit." Id.
Before the Supreme Court's Ferens decision, courts were split over which law-the
transferor or the transferee-to apply in plaintiff-initiated transfers. See Norwood, supra note 1,
at 523 -24 n. 121; Henninger, supra note 20, at 823 -24; Smith, supra note 20, at 199-201; John D.
Currivan, Note, Choice of Law In Federal Court After Transfer of Venue, 63 CORNELL L. REv.
149, 154-56 (1977). For further analysis of Ferens, see authorities cited supra note 20.
42. For another idea, see John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal
Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 735, 781 n.166 (1991). Professor Oakley offers the following hypothetical:
Personal jurisdiction has always been fairly easy to establish in multiple forums as
against major business enterprises, and now the same is true as to ordinary Joes and
Janes who like to travel, thanks to the approval of transient jurisdiction in Burnham
v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). Let's suppose that you want to sue my
wife, Freddie, and me in New Mexico because New Mexico's substantive law looks
good to you and your cause of action implicates New Mexico's interests
significantly enough to allow New Mexico to apply its own law to your claim
against us. Your only problem is our lack of minimum contacts with New Mexico.
Burnham and your knowledge that we will soon be driving from Davis to Austin
solves that problem for you. So be it. Forum-shopping is your right and
privilege-but (formerly) only at a price .... If you wanted to try your case against
us under New Mexico law, you had to try your case against us in New Mexico, and
in a state court unless we removed the action. Your attempt to file a diversity suit
against us in the a New Mexico federal court would allow us to transfer it under
§ 1406, with a resulting change in substantive law. So your forum-shopping might
well leave you stuck in a New Mexico state court, at some considerable
inconvenience.
But no longer. Bargain forum-shoppers, come to federal court for a 3-for-1
forum-shopping special. Sorry, this offer limited only to multiple-defendant suits
qualifying for diversity jurisdiction. If you qualify, enjoy the federal courts' triple-
value special. First, shop as you regularly would among the forums with personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. Enjoy the special due process discount of
Burnham, which may bring many more forums within your reach than you had ever
thought possible. Then, as usual, pick the forum with the best substantive law.
Second, enjoy the new Congressional waiver of any concern in multiple-defendant
actions about that old federal courts bugaboo, proper venue. For diversity suitors
Congress now says personal jurisdiction will suffice to establish venue over the
hapless defendants if they can collectively be subjected to personal jurisdiction in
the plaintiff's chosen forum, wherever that might be, even if the defendants were
just driving through the forum when Burnham lowered the boom. After shopping
for a New Mexico forum, for example, bring your suit under the familiar Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and enjoy the other conveniences of suit in the federal
court system. Third, at no extra charge, you can now transfer that suit from silly old
New Mexico, which had favorable law for you but little else to recommend it as a
forum. Not only are you not stuck in New Mexico state court-you're not even
stuck in New Mexico. Go to our special federal courts forum-shoppers convenience
desk and exchange there your Ferens coupon for a free § 1404 transfer to that more
convenient venue where you would have sued in the first place but for the favorable
substantive New Mexico law-which of course will follow your lawsuit wherever it
may go.
VENUE SHOPPING
under the facts of Ferens that also would have allowed plaintiffs to
secure favorable law. The plaintiffs could have litigated their Penn-
sylvania-based claim in Mississippi. This would have been yet another
way to avoid the unfavorable law of one state, Pennsylvania, while
securing the favorable law of another, Mississippi. In either instance,
however, the plaintiff, simply by filing the lawsuit in a particular juris-
diction, has decisive control over the laws that will apply in the
litigation.
Plaintiffs can also shop among multiple states to secure more
favorable juries. Consider Kemner v. Monsanto Co.43 In Kemner, a
train car, which ruptured as a result of a derailment, leaked a teaspoonful
of dioxin dispersed throughout 19,000 gallons of wood preservative."
Shortly thereafter, about sixty-five people near the area of the spill
began complaining of headaches, depression, insomnia, and other mala-
dies.45 The subsequent lawsuit was filed not in Sturgeon, Missouri-
where the accident occurred and the plaintiffs resided-but in St. Clair
County, Illinois.4 The applicable venue rules in Illinois provided:
§ 2-101. Generally. Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
every action must be commenced (1) in the county of residence of
any defendant who is joined in good faith and with probable cause for
the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him or her and not solely
for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (2) in the county in
which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the
cause of action arose.
If all defendants are nonresidents of the State, an action may be
commenced in any county.4 7
Under this section, because the wood preservative that leaked during the
derailment was made in and shipped from St. Clair County, Illinois,4
venue in St. Clair County was proper. And because St. Clair County is
nationally known for both its verdicts for plaintiffs and its large damage
Some scholars believe that the situation described in Professor Oakley's hypothetical would be
rare in light of the 1992 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). See, e.g., 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2d § 3802
(2d ed. Supp. 1995).
43. 576 N.E.2d 1146 (Il. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 130 (I11. 1991).
44. Patrick E. Gauen, Dioxin Plaintiffs May Appeal: 'We All Lose,' Their Attorney Says;
'Baloney,' Monsanto Counters, ST. Louis PosT-Disp., June 13, 1991, at IA.
45. Kemner, 576 N.E.2d at 1150.
46. Id. at 1149.
47. ILL. A~NN. STAT. ch. 735 § 5/2-101 (Snmith-Hurd 1992) (emphasis added). Under the
Illinois venue statute, if the defendant is not an Illinois resident, venue is proper in any county in
that state. See Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 191, 198 n.15 (1995).
48. Patrick E. Gauen, Dioxin Verdict Reversed: Appeals Panel Voids $16 Million Judgment,
ST. Louis PosT-Disp., June 12, 1991, at IA; Kemner, 576 N.E.2d at 1150.
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awards,a9 the county was, no doubt, preferred over a Missouri venue
with no such reputation.
Ferens and Kemner involved choices among multiple states. But
shopping for the venue of one's choice can also take place within the
same state. In any given state, plaintiffs might prefer to file suit in cer-
tain cities over other cities, in certain counties over other counties, in
certain counties over certain cities, or in certain cities over certain coun-
ties. Plaintiffs may choose one location over another because of conven-
ience-to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's witnesses or evidence, or the
plaintiff's attorney; or plaintiffs may choose a location because of its
inconvenience to their adversary. Other reasons for choosing a site
include favorable local rules, judicial calendars, and potential trial
dates."0 Another reason relates to the reputation of potential jurors (or
judges) for giving favorable awards. Bay City, Texas, for example, was
likened by some attorneys to the fabled City of Gold because of the
large personal injury damages awarded there."1 In the bankruptcy area,
law firms have been known to file in Brownsville, Texas, rather than in
available Dallas courts, to keep attorney "fee applications out of the
hands of Dallas' notoriously stingy bankruptcy courts. '52 Madison and
St. Clair Counties, Illinois, are nationally known for pro-plaintiff ver-
dicts and very large damage awards.53 Indeed, when the Illinois Legisla-
ture recently considered legislation that would limit noneconomic
damages for certain tort-based injuries, "an 1 lth-hour stampede" took
place in courts throughout the state.5 4 But in Madison and St. Clair
Counties, the results were even more astounding.55 Note also Barbour
49. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
51. See Gary Taylor, Is It the Best Little Plaintiffs' City in Texas?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 8, 1986,
at 8.
52. Diane B. Beckham & Amy Boardman, Learning From Lorenzo; Weil, Gotshal Steers
Greyhound to Friendly Turf, LEGAL TIMEs, June 18, 1990, at 2. For other relevant forum-
shopping considerations in the bankruptcy area, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 11.
53. See Meg Fletcher, To Testify or Not: A Costly Question For Execs, Bus. INS. June 13,
1994, at 3; John M. McGuire, Full Contact Law: Who Stars In Courtroom Dramas? For John
Jenkins, It's the Lawyers, ST. Louis PosT-Disp. MAo., Feb. 25, 1990, at 12; Stewart McBride, Is
It Libel If It's Never Printed?, CHRIST. Sci. MoN., June 25, 1981, at Al, A6.
54. Rob Thomas, Illinois Bill Would Limit Damages In Lawsuits, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH,
Mar. 3, 1995, at 1, 6.
55. In the two days following word of the pending legislation, lawyers filed 20 times more
lawsuits than usual in Madison and 160 more than usual in St. Clair. Id. The Governor of Illinois
signed the bill into law on Mar. 9, 1995. The Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, 1995
Legis. Serv. P.A. 89-7, § 15 (West) (codified at ILL. A, N. ST. ch. 735, § 5/2-1115.1) (Smith-Hurd
1995), puts a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages and virtually eliminates the doctrine of joint
and several liability, among other things. In light of these changes, out-of-state attorneys should
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County, a small county in Alabama, that is "nationally recognized [by
defendants] as tort hell."' 6 But when trying to secure a venue based on
the potential jury pool-whether the choice is among multiple states or
within the same state-sometimes creative thinking is required. Futrell
v. Luhr Bros.57 is an example.
In Futrell, plaintiff was employed as a deckhand on a vessel owned
by Luhr Bros.58 In April 1990, plaintiff suffered personal injuries while
working on the vessel.5 9 The injuries occurred on navigable waters in
Louisiana.6 ° Plaintiff filed a state court action in St. Louis, Missouri,
against the corporate owner of the vessel, Luhr Bros., and against a
noncorporate defendant, the vessel's captain, Raines. 61 The three-count
petition alleged two violations of the Jones Act62 against Luhr Bros. and
one count of false imprisonment against Luhr Bros. and Raines. 63
At all times relevant to the litigation, plaintiff lived in Cape Girar-
deau, Missouri. 64 Luhr Bros. was an Illinois corporation licensed to do
business in Missouri. 6  Although Luhr Bros. maintained a registered
agent in St. Louis for service of process purposes, 66 its principal place of
business was in the city of plaintiff's residence-Cape Girardeau. 67
Defendant Raines lived in Scott City, Missouri.68 None of the parties to
the lawsuit resided in St. Louis, and none of the events giving rise to the
lawsuit occurred in St. Louis. Yet, plaintiff chose to file there. Probably
not coincidently, juries in the city of St. Louis render higher damage
awards than juries in the counties of St. Louis.69
Had plaintiff sued only the corporate defendant, venue would not
have been proper in the city of St. Louis, but only in Cape Girardeau,
i.e., the county of plaintiff's residence and the county where the corpo-
ration maintained an office or agent for the transaction of usual and cus-
think twice about choosing an Illinois venue if their plaintiff-clients can file in states without these
limitations.
56. Gregory Jaynes, Where the Torts Blossom, TIME, Mar. 20, 1995, at 38.
57. Second Amended Petition, Futrell v. Luhr Bros., No. 91-9978 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis, Mo.,
filed Dec. 1991) (on file with author).
58. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, Futrell v. Luhr. Bros., No. 67863 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(on file with author).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1.
62. 46 App. U.S.C.A. § 688 (Supp. 1995).
63. Second Amended Petition, Futrell, No. 91-9978.





69. See Mega Collins, High Stakes Law: Injury Lawyers Risk Big Sums to Win Cases, ST.
Louis Bus. J. Oct. 26, 1987, at BI.
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tomary business. Missouri's corporate venue statute provides, in
relevant part, that "[s]uits against corporations shall be commenced
either in the county where the cause of action accrued, . . . or in any
county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or
agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business."7 ° Mis-
souri case law further established that in actions against corporate
defendants, venue could not be based on the mere employment of a reg-
istered agent. 7' Thus, Luhr Bros.' employment of a registered agent in
St. Louis would not have been sufficient to secure venue in St. Louis.
Moreover, had plaintiff sued only Raines, venue would not have been
proper in the city of St. Louis, but rather in Scott County-the county
encompassing Raines' Scott City residence, or possibly in Cape Girar-
deau County, where plaintiff lived.72
By joining the two defendants in the action, plaintiff first convinced
the court, rightly,73 that Missouri's corporate venue statute did not
apply. 74 Rather, Missouri's general venue statute for multiple defend-
ants applied. The latter provides that "[w]hen there are several defend-
ants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought in any
such county."75 However, plaintiff then argued that because the corpo-
rate defendant employed a registered agent in St. Louis, St. Louis could
be considered the residence of the corporation within the meaning of the
general venue statute.76 Although the employment of a registered agent
could not have been used to secure venue against a sole corporate
defendant under Missouri's corporate venue statute,77 the court agreed
that under Missouri's general venue statute employment of a registered
agent was sufficient to secure venue.78 By joining a noncorporate
70. Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.040 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
71. State ex rel. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Mid-Am. v. Gaertner, 681 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Mo.
1984) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. DePaul Health Cent. v. Mummert,
870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
72. Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(l) (Vernon Supp. 1995), which applies only when a sole
individual (i.e, one noncorporate defendant) is a party to the litigation, provides in relevant part
that venue is proper "either in the county within which the defendant resides, or in the county
within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found." Thus, venue clearly would
exist in the county of Raines' residence. Venue also may have been proper in the county of
plaintiff's residence. Finally, venue was clearly proper in Louisiana, where the accident occurred.
See infra note 283.
73. Under Missouri law, once a noncorporate defendant is joined in the lawsuit, Missouri's
corporate venue statute does not apply. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tumbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d
290, 291 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
74. Turnbough, 589 S.W.2d 290.
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
76. Second Amended Petition, Futrell v. Luhr Bros., No. 91-9978, (Cir. Ct. St. Louis, Mo.,
filed Dec. 1991) (on file with author).
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. This conclusion was reached because every one of the multiple motions to dismiss, to
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defendant in the litigation, then, the St. Louis court allowed the Futrell
plaintiff to do what he could not otherwise do with a lone corporate
defendant.
After securing venue in St. Louis, and despite defense concerns that
the noncorporate defendant was joined pretensively to obtain a jury
more receptive to plaintiffs and higher damage awards,7 9 plaintiff dis-
missed the noncorporate defendant from the lawsuit immediately after
presenting his case to the jury.80 Notwithstanding this dismissal, venue
continued to be proper."'
3. UTILIZING PROCEDURAL RULES TO SECURE THE LAWS OF CHOICE
Whether trying to secure more favorable laws or more favorable
juries, court procedural rules can facilitate the process. Attorneys have
been known, for example, to try to manipulate federal or state court rules
sever, to transfer, for mistrial, and/or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the venue
issue was denied. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 11-13, Futrell, No. 67863 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995). Until Futrell, Missouri law did not answer the question of whether the employment of a
registered agent for service of process purposes was sufficient to secure venue under the general
venue provisions. For example, the leading Missouri decision on the issue, Coca Cola Bottling,
681 S.W.2d at 447, decided only that such employment is an improper ground upon which to
secure venue under the corporate venue statute.
79. Under Missouri law, pretensive joinder exists 1) where "the facts pleaded in the petition
are not true;" or 2) "even if true, do not support a valid claim based on substantive law." State ex
rel. Malone v. Mummert, 889 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). The applicable test in other
jurisdictions is similar. See, e.g., Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11 th Cir. 1983),
superceded by statute. In Futrell, plaintiff properly alleged all the elements of a false
imprisonment claim against defendant Raines. (For a statement of the elements of such a claim,
see Desai v. SSM Health Care, 865 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).). Thus, defendants
were not able to rely upon the second prong of the test. Although defendants alternatively argued
that the first prong of the test was met, i.e., that the facts pleaded in the petition were not true, the
trial court rejected that contention. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, 29-43, Futrell, No.
67863 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
80. Id. at 11.
81. There is authority for the proposition that once venue is properly secured, subsequent
events will not retroactively destroy it. See, e.g., State ex rel Kyger v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 953,
955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Indeed, in Rakestraw v. Norris, 478 S.W.2d 409, 414-15 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972), there was neither fraudulent joinder nor retroactive destruction of venue when the very
defendant whose residency permitted venue to be proper, a relative of the plaintiff, was dismissed
before trial began.
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on joinder of parties8 2 to either secure 3 or defeat a particular venue. 4
82. Two federal rules are relevant. The first, FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a), provides in part:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
The second, FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a), provides in part:
Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to reliefjointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or aris-
ing out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the
action. All persons... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.
Most state courts have parallel rules. For example, Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a) provides in part:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person shall be joined in the action if: (1)
in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.
Missouri Rule 52.05(a) provides in part:
Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or aris-
ing out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. All
persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrences or series of transactions or occurrences and if
any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.
83. See supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 97. See generally Faucett v. Ingersoll-Rand Mining & Mach. Co., 960 F.2d
653, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1992); Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 251 F.2d 930, 934 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); Arzehgar v. Dixon, 150 F.R.D. 92, 94-95 (S.D. Tex.
1993); Schwenn v. Pamida, 392 F. Supp. 69, 70 (D. Wyo. 1975); Jacks v. Torrington Co., 256 F.
Supp. 282, 286 (D.S.C. 1966).
Another example of an attempt to join parties to litigation in order to secure the court of
choice can be found in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In
World-Wide, the plaintiffs, New York residents, purchased a car in New York. Id. at 288. While
driving to a new home in Arizona, they had a car accident in Oklahoma. Id. They subsequently
brought a products liability action in a state court in Creek County, Oklahoma, against the German
manufacturer of the car, the U.S. importer, the regional distributor, and the New York dealer that
sold them the car. Id. Personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer and the importer existed
because both conducted large amounts of business in Oklahoma. However, personal jurisdiction
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Consider also Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41
allows a plaintiff to dismiss a lawsuit voluntarily. Depending on the
timing of the request, the plaintiff may85 or may not86 have to seek the
court's permission to dismiss. But even when plaintiffs must seek leave
of court to dismiss, many plaintiffs have been quite candid with the court
about using Rule 41 for law-shopping purposes. It is not clear, though,
whether the rule can be used this way. The only Supreme Court ruling
did not exist over the regional distributor and the New York dealer because they lacked contacts
with the state. Specifically, plaintiffs failed to show that either of these two defendants "ships or
sells any products to or in [Oklahoma], has an agent to receive process there, . . . [or] that any
automobile sold by [them] has ever entered Oklahoma with the single exception of the vehicle
involved in the present case." Id. at 289. Thus, the Court held that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over these two defendants would offend the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 294-95.
With respect to the plaintiffs' venue choice, Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion,
wondered why "the plaintiffs in this litigation are so insistent that the regional distributor and the
retail dealer ... be named defendants," particularly when the Oklahoma court had jurisdiction
over two other solvent defendants. Id. at 317. As Professor Weintraub answered:
The answer to Justice Blackmun's question is a simple tactical move familiar to any
litigator. "Creek County, Oklahoma, .. is one of the best jurisdictions in the United
States in which to try a plaintiff's lawsuit. It ranks on a par with Dade County,
Florida, and Cook County[,] Illinois .... Counsel for the [plaintiffs] did not want
the defendants to be able to remove the case from this plaintiffs' paradise to the
Federal District Court in Tulsa, Oklahoma. His theory was that, at the time suit
was brought, the [plaintiffs] were still domiciled in New York, because they had not
yet arrived in Arizona. They were, therefore, still residents of New York for the
purposes of determining whether there was federal jurisdiction on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. Bv joining the dealer and regional distributor, both New
York corporations, he could prevent the complete diversity of citizenship between
plaintiffs and defendants that was necessary for removal.
Russell J. Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON TME CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 4.8, at 125 (3d ed. 1986)
(emphases added) (footnotes omitted).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides:
By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon the
defendant of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides in part:
By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. [A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever
first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or
stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or
including the same claim.
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on this issue, Exparte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 7 was decided before Rule
41 was enacted. Exparte Skinner held that the motives behind a dismis-
sal are irrelevant.88 Although lower federal court opinions continue to
say that motive is irrelevant,8 9 these courts remain split on whether the
Rule can be used to law-shop.
The conflict does not turn on whether a given plaintiff is attempting
to shop for laws. Rather, the grant or denial of the motion turns on the
dismissal's effect on the defendant. 90 Many courts apply a "clear legal
prejudice to the defendant" standard in determining whether the court
should allow the voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), although the
language of the rule does not require such a standard.91 Under that
standard:
The crucial question to be determined is, Would the defendant lose
any substantial right by the dismissal. "In exercising its discretion
the court follows the traditional principle that dismissal should be
allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice
other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. It is no bar to
dismissal that plaintiff may obtain some tactical advantage
thereby." 92
Starting from this premise, while some jurisdictions have found
that a particular law-shopping attempt constitutes clear legal prejudice to
the defendant,93 other courts have not so found.94 Courts are more apt to
87. 265 U.S. 86 (1924). Rule 41 was enacted in 1937.
88. Id. at 93 ("The right to dismiss, if it exists, is absolute. It does not depend on the reasons
which the plaintiff offers for his action. The fact that he may not have disclosed all his reasons or
may not have given the real one can not affect his right.").
89. See, e.g, Clubb v. General Motors Corp., 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan), 1434, 1434 (4th
Cir. 1971); Spencer v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 118, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Kennedy v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 46 F.R.D. 12, 14 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
90. See, e.g., Susan C. Taylor, Note, Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissals: Forum Shopping for a Statute
of Limitations, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 629, 631-32 (1990).
91. For further analysis of the "legal prejudice" standard, as well as a discussion of other, less
popular standards, see Lawrence Mentz, Note, Voluntary Dismissal by Order of Court-Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2) and Judicial Discretion, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 446
(1972). For further analysis of Rule 41(a)(2) generally, see David J. Comeaux, Comment,
Avoiding Nonjudicious Nonsuits: Hearing the Defendant in Rule 41(A)(2) Motions, 32 Hous. L.
REv. 159 (1995).
92. Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting 2B
WILLIAM W. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 912, at
114 (Charles A. Wright ed. 1961); see also Phillips v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 986
(5th Cir. 1989); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
93. See, e.g., Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987-88; Placid Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 792 F.2d 1127,
1134 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986); Bamdad Mechanic Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 109 F.R.D.
128, 132-33 (D. Del. 1985).
94. See, e.g. McCants, 781 F.2d at 857259; Bolten v. GMC, 180 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950); Germain v. SEMCO Serv. Mach. Co., 79 F.R.D. 85, 86
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Klar v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 14 F.R.D. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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find legal prejudice where plaintiffs have sought to erase inadvertent
jury waivers, 95 to change the substantive law to be applied at trial, 96 or
to force remand of a case removed from the state court to the federal
court "by a tactical dismissal of the federal claims." 97 However, in cases
where plaintiffs attempt to change the applicable statute of limitations,
the results are not uniform. But most courts98 have found that if plaintiff
seeks a dismissal to secure a longer statute of limitations, legal prejudice
to the defendant simply is not a concern.99 Noting first that "within the
95. See, e.g., Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 86.
96. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 46 F.R.D. 12, 15 (E.D. Ark. 1969)
(denying plaintiff-insured's attempt to dismiss an Arkansas lawsuit and refile in Georgia in order
to avoid Arkansas' validation of anti-stacking provisions as contained in insurance policies);
Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 100, 102 (D. Md. 1954) (denying plaintiff-
taxpayer's attempt to dismiss Maryland action and refile in federal Court of Claims in order to
avoid an adverse decision, reached after plaintiff filed suit, from the Fourth Circuit).
97. Kerrin v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 715, 717 (N.D. Ga. 1983); see also
Myers v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Ga. 1983). In Myers, after the
defendant removed plaintiff's state lawsuit to federal court, plaintiff filed another action in state
court with one change: Plaintiff added resident defendants in order to prevent a second removal.
On plaintiff's subsequent Rule 41 motion in federal court to dismiss the first removed case, the
court noted:
The issue is a sensitive one because of the delicate relationship between the
state and federal judiciaries, the growing concern about the propriety of diversity
jurisdiction, and increasing public impatience with tactical legal maneuvering which
only delays resolution of cases on their merits. If there were no precedents in this
area this court might well ... allow the plaintiff to dismiss his case here and pursue
his remedy in the state court. However, this court is bound to follow two recent
cases which have dealt with this precise issue.
Id. at 502. Those two cases-Frith v. Blazon-Flexible Flyer, Inc., 512 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir.
1975), and Brown v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 309 F. Supp. 48, 49 (N.D. Ga. 1969)-stand
for the proposition that one cannot frustrate the purpose of the removal statute by such "cynical
legal gamesmanship." Id. at 503. Thus, the Myers court denied plaintiff's Rule 41 motion to
dismiss. Id.
98. See supra notes 94 for decisions granting Rule 41 motions to dismiss even though the
movants clearly intended to refile the lawsuits in jurisdictions with longer limitations periods. For
decisions to the contrary, see supra note 93. In Phillips v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984
(5th Cir. 1989), the court stated:
We have not yet addressed the issue of whether loss of a statute of limitations
defense constitutes the type of clear legal prejudice that precludes granting a motion
to dismiss without prejudice. After reviewing the decisions of other courts on this
issue we are persuaded, however, that those cases denying the motion to dismiss are
better reasoned. We agree that the mere prospect of a second lawsuit on the same
facts is not sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to justify denial of a Rule
41(a)(2) motion to dismiss. In this case, however, the facts in the second lawsuit
would differ in that the defendant would be stripped of an absolute defense to the
suit-the difference between winning the case without a trial and abiding the
unknown outcome of such a proceeding. If this does not constitute clear legal
prejudice to the defendant, it is hard to envision what would.
Id. at 987 (citation omitted); cf. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 892 F. Supp. 794,
803 (E.D. La. 1995) (" 'Voluntary dismissal should not be used to . . . forum shop .
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
99. See, e.g., McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 859 (11th Cir. 1986).
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limits of jurisdiction and venue, plaintiffs are free to make strategic
choices as to the forum which is most likely to apply law most favorable
to them,"' 00 these courts conclude that a defendant cannot complain of
legal prejudice merely "by being asked to defend a suit that plaintiffs
could properly have brought against it in [the now-preferred forum] in
the first instance."'' 1 Thus, where plaintiff merely seeks "a tactical pro-
cedural advantage"'1 2 by trying to refile an action in a jurisdiction with a
longer limitations period, most courts conclude that a Rule 41 dismissal
is appropriate. 0 3
[W]e find no evidence in the record to suggest that appellee or her counsel acted in
bad faith in filing this action .... Under the circumstances, we cannot find appellant
to have suffered any plain legal prejudice other than the prospect of a second lawsuit
on the same set of facts. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in
granting the dismissal without prejudice in this case.
Id.; see also Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 86. Recall in Germain that the court conditioned granting
plaintiff's Rule 41(a)(2) request on the reason for the dismissal. Thus, although plaintiff's first
reason for dismissal-that plaintiff would thereby "avoid an inadvertent waiver of the right to a
jury trial"--was rejected, plaintiff's alternative reason-that such a dismissal would allow plain-
tiff "to take advantage of a longer statute of limitations in another forum"-served as a valid
reason to grant the dismissal. Id.
100. Gervasi v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 86-4663, 1986 WL 14739, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 29, 1986); see also Watwood v. Barber, 70 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (citation omitted).
The Watwood court stated:
It is true that a reaso4ble inference may be drawn that plaintiffs' decision to move
for a transfer to this district came as a direct consequence of defendants' raising the
defense of Alabama's statute of limitations. However, where, as here, the plaintiffs
could have proceeded at least equally as well in this forum as in Alabama, it does
not seem unreasonable to allow them to "invoke the substantial state policies" of
this state to which they were and are entitled.
Id. Several months later, the Watwood court, after reconsideration, dismissed the action for lack
of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. at 10.
101. Gervasi, 1986 WL 14739, at *2.
102. Kennedy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 46 F.R.D. 12, 15 (E.D. Ark. 1969). Recall
that Kennedy did not allow plaintiff to dismiss under Rule 41 in order to gain any substantive law
advantages. Id.; see also supra note 96. Indeed, the court stated:
It is clear that plaintiff by her motion is seeking something quite different from
a tactical procedural advantage. She desires to have her new forum apply to this
case another body of substantive law which would or might deprive the defendant of
an apparently good defense at this forum. Thus, the shift of forum, if permitted,
would or might seriously disadvantage the defendant, and the Court thinks that it
would amount to legal prejudice to subject the defendant to the risk that plaintiff
may succeed ....
Id. (emphasis added). Because statutes of limitations are considered "procedural", as opposed to
"substantive", see Norwood, supra note 1, at 549-54, the rationale may be that one cannot be
"legally prejudiced" by differences in mere procedural matters.
103. There may be some consolation to defendants. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d) provides:
Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an
action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim
against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs
of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the
proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
[Vol. 50:267
VENUE SHOPPING
4. LACK OF UNIFORMITY AND ITS ROLE IN KEEPING THE
SEARCH ALIVE
Lawyers are often given conflicting signals about the virtues of
forum-shopping in general and of law-shopping in particular. 104 Some
decisions criticize and even sanction such attempts;105 others implicitly
or expressly condone forum-shopping. 06 Indeed, it is not unusual to
See also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); McCants, 781 F.2d at 859; Behrle v. Olshansky, 139 F.R.D. 370,
375-76 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 87; Klar v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 14
F.R.D. 176, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
In Simeone v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 971 F.2d 103, 108 (8th Cir. 1992) the court stated that
costs imposed under Rule 41(d) "are intended to serve as a deterrent to forum shopping .... "
104. There do not appear to be conflicting signals when jury-shopping is involved. Although
cases are filed every day in certain counties across the country with the clear purpose of securing
the jury pool, the author has been unable to find much authority addressing this strategy. Accord
McAllen, supra note 47, at 241.
105. See Phillips v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1989); Placid Oil
Co. v. Ashland Oil Co., 792 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986); Fransen v. Terps
Ltd. Liab. Co., 153 F.R.D. 655, 660 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Lit., No. Civ.
A. MDL-863, 1994 WL 599762, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 1994); Marlow v. Winston & Strawn,
No. 90-C-5715, 1994 WL 171437, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1994); Anderson v. California Rep.
Party, No. C-91-2091-MHP, 1991 WL 472928, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1991), aff'd sub nom.
Anderson v. Davis, 977 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1992); Mitchell A. Kramer & Assocs. v. Robert S.
Atkins & Assocs., No. 90-C-1941, 1991 WL 2419, at *2 (N.D. I11. Jan. 10, 1991); Behrle, 139
F.R.D. at 372; Rojas v. DeMent, 137 F.R.D. 30, 32-33 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Bolivar v. Pocklington,
137 F.R.D. 202, 205-06 (D.P.R. 1991), aff'd and remanded, 975 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1992); U.S.
Offshore, Inc. v. Seabulk Offshore, Ltd., 753 F. Supp. 86, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Brandenburg v.
City of Chicago, 129 F.R.D. 159, 160-61 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Simeone v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 125
F.R.D. 150, 156-57 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 971 F.2d 103 (8th Cir.
1992); Laine v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 625, 627-28 (N.D. I11. 1989); Naylor v. Lee's
Summit Reorganized Sch. Dist., 703 F. Supp. 803, 819-21 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Washington v.
Williams, 696 F. Supp. 237, 239 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1989); M.S.
Chambers & Son, Inc. v. Tambrands, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 274, 277-78 (D. Mass. 1987); Syncom v.
Brooks, No. 86-C-630, 1987 WL 14696, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1987); Bamdad Mechanic Co. v.
United Technologies Corp., 109 F.R.D. 128, 133-34 (D. Del. 1985); In re Dahlquist, 34 B.R. 476,
487 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983); Sheldon v. Amperex Elec. Corp., 52 F.R.D. 1, 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff 'd, 449 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1971); Plymouth Rubber Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 203
F. Supp. 595, 601 (D. Mass. 1962), aff'd and modified, 321 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1963); Baker v.
Sisk, I F.R.D. 232, 237; see also Michael C. Silberberg, Southern District Civil Practice
Roundup-Rejection of Attempts at Forum Shopping, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1992, at 3; Andrew Okun,
Judge: Insurer Forum-Shopped, L.A. DAILY J., May 15, 1992, at 2.
106. See supra notes 94; see also United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1083-84 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); McCants, 781 F.2d at 857-59; McCuin v. Texas Power
& Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 832
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 750
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); Durham v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d
366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967); Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.2d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1950);
Johnson v. Gegenheimer, No. Civ. A. 92-2863, 1993 WL 205080, at *3 n.1 (E.D La. June 4,
1993); Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 91-3779, 1992 WL 167030, at *5 (E.D. La.
June 30, 1992); Kahn v. Wien, No. Civ. A. 86-2416-RJD, 1989 WL 65449, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); Basic, Inc. v. Norfolk Southern, 684 F. Supp. 123, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Storage Tech.
Partners II v. Storage Tech. Corp., 117 F.R.D. 675, 679-80 (D. Colo. 1987); Coast Mfg. Co., Inc.
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find conflicting signals within a single case.'" 7 The Supreme Court has
not clarified this area. No Supreme Court decision addresses the virtues
of filing lawsuits in particular jurisdictions in order to secure more
favorable juries. In the law-shopping context, the Court promotes law-
shopping ventures in some years, 10 8 but not in others. 10 9 Scholars and
commentators hold conflicting views as well." 0
This conflict cannot always be explained by factual distinctions in
the cases. Of course, many courts routinely frown upon plaintiffs'
v. Keylon, 600 F. Supp. 696, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 86; Klar, 14 F.R.D. at 176; see also Steven Greenhouse,
Class Actions: A Key Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1985, at D2.
107. Consider, for example, Cheeseman, 485 F. Supp. at 214. After noting that the purpose of
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is "to prevent forum shopping," the court went on to say that forum-shopping
is no different from any other strategic decision made by an attorney on behalf of a client.
Further, the court said that as long as a plaintiff forum-shops for the right reason, there is nothing
wrong with the conduct. Id. at 215.
108. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990) ("[F]ew [commentators]
attempt to explain the harm of forum shopping .. "); Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc. 465 U.S. 770,
779 (1984) ("Petitioner's successful search for a State with a lengthy statute of limitations is no
different from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable
substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local populations."). Consider also North Star Steel
Co. v. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995). There, in connection with choosing varying state
limitations periods over one uniform federal limitations period for claims brought under the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109
(1988), the Court stated:
[Petitioners) are right of course that the practice of adopting state statutes of
limitations for federal causes of action can result in different limitation periods in
different states for the same federal action, and correct that some plaintiffs will
canvass the variations and shop around for a forum. But these are just the costs of
the rule itself ....
Id. at 1931-32. The Court was referring to general rule that whenever a federal cause of action
does not contain an express limitations period, Congress ordinarily intends, by its silence, that
courts borrow state law. For further analysis of the concept of borrowing state statutes of limita-
tions for federal claims that do not contain express statutes of limitations, see Kimberly Jade
Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation Period With Real Limitations, 69 IND. L.J. 477 (1994).
109. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992) ("Forum-shopping is thus of
particular concern."); Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991), quoting Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (" '[T]he twin aims of the Erie rule [are] discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.' "); Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) ("With the possibility of multiple state
limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger offorum shopping .. ") (emphasis
added); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964) ("If a change of law were in the offing,
the parties might well regard the section primarily as a forum-shopping instrument.").
110. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION 1-2 (1988); Aaron J.
Broder, Forum Shopping in Asbestos Cases, in 1982 PERSONAL INJURY DESKaOOK 755-57 (Louis
R. Frumer & Marilyn Minzer eds., 1982); Brown, supra note 20; John B. Corr, Thoughts on the
Vitality of Erie, 41 Am. U.L. REv. 1087 (1992); William A. Edmundson, Lawyers' Justice, 88
MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1845 (1990); John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV.
693, 710 (1974); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L.
REv. 553 (1989) [hereinafter Juenger, Forum Shopping]; Friedrich K. Juenger, What's Wrong with
Forum Shopping?, 16 SYDNEY L. REv. 5 (1994) [hereinafter Juenger, What's Wrong?]; Opeskin,
supra note 18; Note, supra note 4, at 1677-80.
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attempts to air their grievances in courts of improper venue, " I I to force a
remand to state courts by either dismissing federal claims or destroying
diversity jurisdiction by adding or dropping certain parties," '2 and to cir-
cumvent state workers' compensation laws by transferring employees to
other states before discharging them." 3 The most uniform rejection of
law-shopping seems to occur when a party attempts to ignore earlier
adverse decisions by attempting to have the same claims aired in differ-
ent courts.II4 And courts have found it perfectly acceptable to choose a
111. Basic, 684 F. Supp. at 125; M.S. Chambers & Son, Inc. v. Tambrans, Inc., 118 F.R.D.
274, 277-78 (D. Mass. 1987); Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ohh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751, 751-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Barton v. Williams, 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callahan) 966, 967-68 (N.D. Ohio
1983).
112. Brandenburg v. City of Chicago, 129 F.R.D. 159, 160-61 (N.D. I1. 1989); Myers v. Hertz
Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 500, 502 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Kerrin v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 715, 717 (N.D. Ga. 1993). But see Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64
F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1995). In Baddie, the plaintifffiled an action in state court containing state law
and federal law claims. After the defendant removed to federal court-another form of forum-
shopping-the plaintiff dismissed all federal claims. The plaintiff then secured a remand back to
state court. The district court, however, ordered the plaintiff to pay, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
the fees defendant had incurred as a result of the removal. Section 1447(c) provides in part that
"[ain order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." The district court justified its award
of fees because of the plaintiff's "manipulative pleading practices." Id. at 489. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, ruling that § 1447(c) does not authorize an award of fees when the initial removal from
state court to federal court is proper. Id. at 491. Moreover, as for the notion that plaintiff should
somehow be penalized for manipulating claims in order to secure a state court forum, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
A plaintiff is entitled to file both state and federal causes of action in state court.
The defendant is entitled to remove. The plaintiff is entitled to settle certain claims
or dismiss them with leave of the court. The district court has discretion to grant or
deny remand. Those are the pieces that comprise plaintiffs' allegedly manipulative
pleading practices. We are not convinced that such practices were anything to be
discouraged.
The district court reasoned that plaintiffs had been "manipulative" because: "If
plaintiffs wished to avoid federal court, they should have dropped their federal
claims before ever filing a complaint." We disagree. Filing federal claims in state
court is a legitimate tactical decision by the plaintiff: It is an offer to the defendant
to litigate the federal claims in state court. The defendant is not obligated to
remove.... If the defendant rejects the plaintiff's offer to litigate in state court and
removes the action, the plaintiffmust then choose between federal claims and a state
forum. Plaintiffs in this case chose the state forum. They dismissed their federal
claims and moved for remand with all due speed after removal. There was nothing
manipulative about that straight-forward tactical decision, and there would be little
to be gained in judicial economy by forcing plaintiffs to abandon their federal
causes of action before filing in state court.
Id. at 490-91. The court also noted that sanction under FED. R. Civ. P. I I would be improper
because there was nothing "reprehensible about plaintiffs' maneuvers." Id. at 491.
113. Gann v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.3d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1995).
114. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enters., 886 F.2d 1485, 1490 (7th Cir. 1989); Fransen v. Terps
Ltd. Liab. Co., 153 F.R.D. 655, 660 (D. Colo. 1994); Rojas v. DeMent, 137 F.R.D. 30, 32-33
(S.D. Fla. 1991); Bolivar v. Pocklington, 137 F.R.D. 202, 205-06 (D.P.R. 1991); Anderson v.
California Rep. Party, No. C-91-2091-MHP, 1991 WL 474928, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1991);
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court based upon its perceived "superior discovery procedures"' 5 or
because the chosen forum does not have the same "delays" that another
"overburdened" forum has. 1 6 But many law-shopping cases resolve
identical venue issues in contradictory manners. Thus, even if one
focuses on decisions based upon virtually identical facts or relying upon
identical federal rules, conflicting results often appear. For example, if
the plaintiffs' attorney in Ferens had attempted either to litigate the
Pennsylvania-based claim in Mississippi or to file in Mississippi but
seek a transfer to Pennsylvania at some other time or in some other state,
that attempt might well have been rejected.' " Also recall those Rule 41
cases involving requested dismissals in order to refile in jurisdictions
with longer statutes of limitations." 8 Some courts allow the maneu-
ver;119 others do not.' 20 Finally, compare the cases concluding that as
long as the action has been filed in a proper venue, law-shopping is
U.S. Offshore, Inc. v. Seabulk Offshore, Ltd., 753 F. Supp. 86, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Naylor v.
Lee's Summit Reorganized Sch. Dist., 703 F. Supp. 803, 819-21 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Syncom v.
Brooks, No. 86-C-630, 1987 WL 14696, at *1-2 (N.D. IIl. July 21, 1987).
115. Storage Tech. Partners II v. Storage Tech Corp., 117 F.R.D. 675, 679 (D. Colo. 1987).
116. Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
117. One pre-Ferens Mississippi district court decision, Washington v. Williams, 696 F. Supp.
237, 239 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1989), and one post-Ferens Mississippi
district court decision, Frazier v. Commercial Credit Corp., 755 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (S.D. Miss.
1991), rejected plaintiffs' attempts to file lawsuits in Mississippi in order to gain procedural
advantages under Mississippi law and then, while retaining such advantages, to transfer the
lawsuits, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to other jurisdictions. See also Laine v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 124 F.R.D. 625, 625 (N.D. I1. 1989). Plaintiff in Laine was sanctioned for filing a lawsuit in
Illinois, a proper venue, where every event tied to the lawsuit had occurred in Utah. Id. at 627-28.
118. See supra notes 85-103.
119. See supra notes 93.
120. See supra note 94.
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acceptable' 2 ' with those reaching the opposite result.1 22
There are no uniform opinions on the acceptability of filing law-
suits in given venues in order to obtain more favorable laws or more
favorable juries. But the overwhelming majority of decisions accepts
these two types of forum-shopping as legitimate tactical maneuvers. 23
121. See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 457 (2d Cir. 1995) (" 'Attorneys are not
under an affirmative obligation to file an action in the most convenient forum; their only
obligation is to file in a proper forum.' ") (quoting Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1463-64
(9th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830-31 (1lth Cir. 1982) (stating that
despite the contention that the government chose to sue defendant in the jurisdiction it believed
would be most favorable, defendant had no cause to complain because venue was proper).
Consider also Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 91-3779, 1992 WL 167030 (E.D. La.
June 30, 1992), where the court stated:
Allstate complains that Washington has engaged in blatant forum shopping. The
Court agrees, but finds in that accusation no warrant for Allstate's indignation. The
Supreme Court seems entirely willing to permit successful forum shopping in this
context. Because the Supreme Court has fully considered the forum shopping
argument in this context and has refused to alter the relevant doctrines in order to
prevent it, this Court will not do so.
Id. at *5. Finally, consider Kahn v. Wien, No. Civ. A. 86-2416-RJD, 1989 WL 65449 (E.D.N.Y.
1989). In response to a defense allegation that the only reason plaintiff filed in the venue at issue
was to avoid assignment of its case to a judge in the most convenient and logical venue, the court
stated:
In sum, it remains unclear whether plaintiff's attorneys have actually engaged
in forum shopping, but even if they have, such a finding is not conclusive of the
transfer issue, since "[florum shopping is no more an evil than any other tactical
determination a party makes in its behalf." Indeed, "[a]ny competent lawyer
chooses a forum with his or her client's interests in mind."
Id. at *4 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
122. See supra note 105; see also Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. 84329, 1996
WL 26554 (Fla. Jan. 25, 1996). Note also Laine v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 625 (N.D.
I11. 1989), where the court stated:
But I see no predicate for haling three individual Utah citizens and residents
into an Illinois district court, where Utah is where the complained-of conduct
occurred and Illinois has no connection to this action at all. That is forum-shopping
with a vengeance, and it ought to be discouraged with all the vigor at a court's
disposal.
Id. at 627-28; see also Washington v. Williams, 696 F. Supp. 237, 239 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd,
884 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a lawsuit because the only connection with the forum
was that one of the defendants was qualified to do business there).
123. Other examples of forum-shopping could also be explored. For example, in addition to
striking potential jurors for cause, the federal court system allows, within defined numerical
limits, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994) (civil cases); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (1988) (criminal
cases); Jon M. Van Dyke, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES, 282-84 (1977), litigators to dismiss
potential jurors without cause as long as there are nonrace- or nongender-based reasons for the
dismissal. The same holds true for the state system. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (gender). Thus, the
whole area of striking jurors arguably is a method ofjuror-shopping. Accord Note, supra note 4,
at 1678-79. Moreover, there may be ways to get around race and gender prohibitions. Consider
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (holding invalid a black male defendant's objection to the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike the only two black men from the venire where
prosecutor explained he had challenged the two because, inter alia, both had facial hair); see also
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Judge-shopping, however, is another matter. Consider the following.
B. A Comparison to Judge-Shopping
As an administrative matter, every court in this country has some
mechanism to assign incoming cases to the various judges. Many
courts, in both the federal and state court systems, adopt random assign-
ment procedures. The exact rules of random assignment vary from court
to court. The idea, however, involves placing the names of all judges in
a particular court on a wheel, so to speak, and spinning the wheel every
time a new case is filed. When the wheel stops, it identifies the judge
who will try the newly filed case. 124  The main purpose of random
assignment is to "prevent[] judge shopping by any party, thereby
enhancing public confidence in the assignment process."'' 25  Another
benefit of random assignment is to "ensure[ ] an equitable distribution of
the case load among the judges of [the] court."' 126
Too Fat to Serve, or Too Flamboyant?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at A8. In this article about a
California murder-and-robbery case, People v. Galbert, a prosecutor was allowed to exclude from
service the only three black potential jurors because one wore her hair in braids; a second was
"'grossly overweight' wearing 'a skirt that's hiked halfway up her thighs when she sits....' ";
and the third "was fat, wore a suit with big gold buttons and had long dangling earrings." Id.
Examples of court-shopping or law-shopping can be found in cases where defendants remove
cases filed in state court to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441; or, in cases where
defendants attempt to secure a more favorable venue by moving to transfer the litigation from one
federal court to another, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or 1406. See Neal Miller; An Empirical
Study of Forum Choice In Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41
AM. U. L. Ray. 369 (1992); Note, supra note 4, at 1679. Rampant forum-shopping also takes
place in the review of administrative agency decisions under the "Race to the Courthouse" statute,
as contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1994). See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Multi-Party Forum
Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. Rav. 302 (1980). Finally,
consider a recent possibility, suggested by Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995),
where plaintiff brought an action based on diversity jurisdiction against the defendant to collect on
three separate loans: one each for $40,000, $23,696, and $14,700. After some discovery, the
court dismissed the claim of $40,000 because of plaintiff's inability to overcome, inter alia, a
statute of frauds defense. When that claim was dismissed, the jurisdictional amount fell below the
requisite $50,000. Thus, the trial court dismissed the remainder of plaintiff's action for lack of
jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit, reversing and remanding, suggested that the district court
consider retaining the matter under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, as contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1367. Id. at 112-13. What if plaintiff's counsel knew that the plaintiff would not be able
to overcome a defense such as the statute of frauds? If so, the decision to seek a federal venue,
knowing that the amount for diversity jurisdiction could not be met, would pay off.
124. See Daniel Wise, Format Ends Judge-Shopping in Civil, Not Criminal Cases, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 9, 1987, at 1.
125. United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992); Alan Kohn, Southern
District Panel Studies Ways to End Judge-Shopping, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at I [hereinafter
Kohn, Southern District]; Alan Kohn, US. Court Revises Format to Curtail 'Judge-Shopping,'
N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1987, at I [hereinafter Kohn, U.S. Court]; Daniel Wise, Panel Seeks Reform of
Case Assignment Rule: City Bar Committee Urges Change in Related-Case Process to Curb
Vestiges of 'Judge-Shopping,' N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 1989, at 1.
126. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. at 61.
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Additionally, courts employ other mechanisms purportedly to
ensure the impartiality of the decision-maker. Several states allow "per-
emptory challenges"'' 27 of the first judge randomly assigned to the
case.' 28 A typical peremptory-challenge-of-judge statute or court rule
allows a party to strike the first judge assigned to a case without specify-
ing a reason. 129 The case is then randomly assigned to another judge.
Parties can also remove judges "for cause," a term usually referring to
bias or prejudice. Thus, because "[t]he right of all litigants to a fair and
impartial trial is guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and
127. The term "peremptory challenge" is most commonly associated with a party's right to
challenge or strike a prospective juror from a case. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as
The right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a
reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an action, both civil and
criminal, has a specified number of such challenges and after using all his
peremptory challenges he is required to furnish a reason for subsequent challenges.
BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARv 1136 (6th ed. 1990). The term, however, is not confined to the strik-
ing ofjurors, but can be applied to judges as well. See, e.g., United States v. Escobar, 803 F. Supp.
611, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing court rules, state statutes, case law, and scholarly publications).
128. Nineteen states, either by statute or court rule, allow parties at least one peremptory
challenge of a judge. See Escobar, 803 F. Supp. at 614. See generally Roger M. Baron, A
Proposal for the Use of a Judicial Peremptory Challenge System in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. Rv. 49
(1988); Linda de la Mora, Note, Statute Allowing Substitution of Judge upon Peremptory
Challenge Does Not Violate Separation of Powers Doctrine. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 315
N. W2d 703 (1982), 66 MARQ. L. Rv. 414 (1983); Robert A. Levinson, Comment, Peremptory
Challenges of Judges in the Alaska Courts, 6 UCLA-AJAsKA L. REv. 269 (1977); Kraig J.
Marton, Comment, Peremptory Challenges of Judges: The Arizona Experience, 1973 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 95; Jon B. Ables & Charles A. Thompson. Note, Change of Judge in Indiana: A
Continuing Dilemma, 2 IND. LEGAL. F. 164 (1968-69); Note, Change of Venue and Change of
Judge in a Civil Action in Indiana: Proposed Reforms, 38 IND. L.J. 289 (1963). Similar
legislation has routinely failed at the federal level. See, e.g., H.R. 3125, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 1649, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). An analysis of why Congress has failed to enact
legislation that would allow parties to peremptorily challenge federal judges is beyond the scope
of this Article. To learn the substance of the debate, however, see Escobar, 803 F. Supp. at 614-
15 (citing numerous authorities on the issue). See also Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the
Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. 1Ev. 1445 (1981); Peter A.
Galbraith, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. REv. 109 (1974);
Alan J. Chaset, Disqualification of Federal Judges by Peremptory Challenge, FED. JUD. CTR. 1
(Feb. 1981); John R. Bartels, Peremptory Challenges to Federal Judges: A Judge's View, 68
A.B.A. J. 449 (1982); Richard M. Coleman, An Idea Whose Time Has Come, L.A. LAW., Sept.
1981, at 6; Russell lungerich, The Time Has Come, L.A. LAW., Sept. 1980, at 16; Martha
Middleton, 'Peremptory Challenge' of Judges Proposed, 68 A.B.A. J. 670 (1982); A Proposal for
Peremptory Challenges of Federal Judges in Civil and Criminal Cases, 36 RECORD OF ASS'N OF
BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 231 (1981); Neal A. Jackson, Allow Peremptory Challenges of Federal
District Judges?, LITIG. NEws July 1981, at 3; Ruth Marcus, A Defense Veto Over Judges?, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 11, 1980, at 3; Becky Morrow, Peremptory Challenges of Federal Judges Supported,
L.A. DAILY J., May 22, 1980, at 1; Daniel Wise, Federal Bar Council Opposes Peremptory
Challenge of Judge, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 1986, at 1; ABA Backs Defendant's Right to Request
Change of Judge, N.Y. L.J. June 16, 1980, at 2.
129. See, e.g., Mo. R. Civ. P. 51.05; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 40(d)(1); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
735 s. 5/2-1001 (Smith-Hurd 1995), quoted infra note 153.
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fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution[,] 'J " 3° "[a]n
impartial judge [is] an indispensable element of the due process right to
a fair trial."'' In both the state and federal court systems, if a party can
prove that the judge assigned to hear the lawsuit is biased or prejudiced
against the party, or cannot otherwise be impartial, the party can move to
remove the judge for cause.' 32  Importantly, however, regardless of
whether a judge is challenged for cause or struck under a peremptory
130. David C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal Judges, 30 KAN. L. REv. 255,
255 (1982). The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides: "No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause provides "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Gary L. Karl, Note, Disqualification of Federal District Court Judges for Bias or
Prejudice: Problems, Problematic Proposals, and a Proposed Procedure, 46 ALB. L. REv. 229,
229 (1981) (footnote omitted); see also Hjelmfelt, supra note 130; Susan E. Barton, Note, Judicial
Disqualification in the Federal Courts: Maintaining an Appearance of Justice Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, 1978 L. FORUM 863, 863; Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts,
79 HAgv. L. REv. 1435, 1435 (1966).
132. See, e.g., Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco, 686 F.2d 1291, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1982), on
reh'g, 716 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983); Solberg v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1148, 1154-55 (Cal.
1977); Baron, supra note 128, at 50-52; Robert H. Aronson, Comment, Disqualification of Judges
for Bias or Prejudice-A New Approach, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 448; Disqualification of Judges for
Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 OR.
L. REv. 311 (1969).
In the federal system, two statutes control a party's right to remove a federal judge for cause.
The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994), provides in part:
Bias or prejudice of judge
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear
such proceeding.
The second statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988), which deals with impartiality in broader terms
and does not require action by the parties, provides in part:
Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify him-
self in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or per-
sonal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in contro-
versy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has
been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capac-
ity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceed-
ing or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in
controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
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challenge mechanism, the parties are never entitled to their judge of
choice; 133 they are entitled only to impartiality.
Despite these rules designed to ensure assignment of impartial
judges, lawyers still attempt to circumvent them. Some lawyers have
filed lawsuits against presiding judges to try to force them to step
aside. 134  Some have asserted baseless accusations against judges to try
to force recusal.135 Some have attempted to refile previously dismissed
actions in hope of securing a judge of choice. 136  Some have filed
motions for change of venue in order to avoid randomly assigned
judges. 137 Some have filed cases in highly inconvenient jurisdictions to
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person;
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;.
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
133. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6351, 6355. The report, which reflects the sentiment behind the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 455,
reproduced supra note 132, provides in relevant part:
[In] assessing the reasonableness of a challenge to his impartiality, each judge must
be alert to avoid the possibility that those who would question his impartiality are in
fact seeking to avoid the consequences of his expected adverse decision.
Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a reasonable basis. Nothing in
this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the transformation of a litigant's
fear that a judge may decide a question against him into a "reasonable fear" that the
judge will not be impartial. Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is
a reasonable question of impartiality. but they are not entitled to judges of their own
choice.
(second emphasis added); see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Milken v. SEC, 490 U.S. 1102 (1989); In re Singh, 123 F.R.D.
140, 148 (D.N.J. 1988); Crider v. Keohane, 484 F. Supp. 13, 15 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Mavis v.
Commercial Carriers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 55, 61-62 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Buffalo, 867 F. Supp. 1155, 1162-63 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); In re
Schaefer, 154 B.R. 227, 230 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1993); Andersen v. Roszkowski, 681 F. Supp.
1284, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990).
135. See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443-44 (9th Cir.
1995); Raffe v. Citibank, N.A., No. 84-C-0305, 1987 WL 10825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 1987).
It is clear that one cannot use motions to recuse or motions to disqualify as vehicles for judge-
shopping. See, e.g., McCann v. Communications Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1506, 1522 (D.
Conn. 1991); U.S. v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641, 651-53 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 869 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Blizard v. Fielding, 454 F. Supp. 318, 321-22 (D.
Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Blizzard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Baker, 441 F. Supp. 612, 615 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
136. See Smith v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., No. 84-Civ.-91 I -CSH, 1985 WL 561, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1985), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987).
137. See, e.g., Hader v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 566 N.E.2d 736, 740-41 (I11. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d 914 (I11. 1991); Theodore Postel, Change of Venue: Judge-
Shopping, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 3, 1991, at 1; Theodore Postel, Defendant Is a Judge, CH.
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avoid judges in more convenient jurisdictions.13 Some, by filing a
given case first, have ensured that subsequent related cases are also
assigned to the judge selected to preside over the first case. 3 9 And
some lawyers, with the help of friendly filing clerks 14° or through their
own guesswork,' 41 have been able to secure a judge of choice.
Consider the attempt by two attorneys at the Chicago law firm of
Mayer, Brown & Platt to secure decision-makers of their choice. The
attorneys attempted to circumvent a court rule requiring random assign-
ment of judges1 42 by increasing the likelihood that their judge of choice
would be assigned their case. The attorneys represented the Chicago
Catholic Archdiocese in a lawsuit seeking to overturn an arbitration
award to a construction company. 43 Although they were aware of the
Cook County Court Chancery Division rule providing for random
DAILY L. BULL., Sept 30, 1986, at 1; John F. Rooney, Venue Change Granted in Breast Implant
Cases-Case Will Not Be Heard By a Woman Judge, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 27, 1992, at 3.
In his article, Rooney wrote:
Circuit Judge Monica D. Reynolds, Cook County's only female chancellor, has
granted a defendant's request for a change of venue in the breast implant class
action litigation. "It is now guaranteed so long as [the case] remains in the Chancery
Division it won't by heard by a woman judge." said Jewel N. Klein, one of the lead
plaintiffs' lawyers and a past president of the Women's Bar Association of Illinois.
"That's a disappointment.["]
Id. (alteration in original).
138. See, e.g., Kahn v. Wien, No. Civ.-86-2416-RJD, 1989 WL 65449, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. June
6, 1989).
139. See Steven Brill, When the Government Goes Judge Shopping, Am. LAW., Nov. 1988, at
3.
140. Several litigators have told the author that it is not unusual to withdraw a lawsuit
immediately after the name of an unwanted judge is chosen-but just before the case is
"officially" assigned to that judge-and then to refile it.
141. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 1678; Edward J. Burke, Court to Probe Forum-Shoppers,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 5; Kohn, Southern District, supra note 125; Kohn, US. Court, supra
note 125; Vitt, supra note 5, at 129; Wise, supra note 124; see also Weyman 1. Lundquist, The
New Art of Forum Shopping, Lino., Spring 1985, at 21, 22 ("Lawyers have been known to pass
time in the clerk's office awaiting a file stamp showing that Judge Miserly has just drawn a case
on the random selection list and then file on the statistically sound theory that seldom do the face
of the dice repeat on the next roll.").
142. The applicable rule, General Order 3.1 of the Circuit Court of Cook County, provides in
relevant part: "Assignment of Cases-Chancery... Each case filed in the Chancery Division of
the Circuit Court of Cook County shall be assigned by the Clerk of the Circuit Court to a trial
calendar using electronic data processing equipment. Such assignment shall be made by random
electronic process as hereinafter provided." SULLIVAN'S LAW DIRECrORY 671c (118th ed. 1994).
General Order 3.1 goes on to detail the exact procedures to be followed under the court's random
assignment system. Id.
143. David Bailey, OK for Lawyers Who Forum-Shopped to Seek Censure from Supreme
Court: ARDC Panel, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 13, 1994, at 1; Laura Duncan, Judge to Seek
Probe of Forum Shopping, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 5, 1994, at 1; Sherrie F. Nachman, What
Kind of Judge Was Mayer, Brown Praying For?, AM. LAW., June 1994, at 26; John F. Rooney,
'Forum-Shopping' Broke Ethics Rules, ARDC Complaint Alleges, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 1,
1994, at 1; Randall Samborn, Chicago Judge Sanctions Firm, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A4.
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assignment of judges, 144 the attorneys nevertheless explored ways to cir-
cumvent the rule.1 45  They prepared and filed five identical com-
plaints1 46 in the hope that the case would be assigned to one of three
judges out of the eleven on the chancery court. 147 Along with the five
complaints, the attorneys gave their law firm's docket clerk "the names
of three judges they hoped would be assigned to the case and told the
docket clerk to stop filing copies of the complaint if one of the judges
was assigned to the case."1 48 The docket clerk filed all five complaints
within fourteen minutes.' 49 Within two weeks the attorneys' attempt at
foiling the court's random assignment rule was discovered.' 50 The attor-
neys subsequently consented to censure and a fine. 1 '
In Illinois, where the judge-shopping occurred, the law allows par-
ties to remove judges for cause, 5 2 to peremptorily challenge the first
judge assigned to a case, 53 and to seek venue changes and/or voluntarily
144. Petition to Impose Discipline on Consent at 3, In re Gill and Marks, Comm'n Nos. 94-
CH-837 & 838 (Ill. filed Dec. 16, 1994). A copy of the Petition is on file with the author. See
also Bailey, supra note 143, at 1.
145. See Petition, at 3-4, Gill.
146. See Nancy Zeldis, Mayer Brown Admits to Judge-Shopping Scheme, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11,
1994, at A13; see also supra notes 144.
147. Nachman, supra note 143.
148. Rooney, supra note 137; see also Petition at 4, Gill. The attorneys also instructed the file
clerk "to telephone [attorney] Marks for additional instructions in the event all five complaints
were filed and none of the filings resulted in the assignment of a matter to one of the preferred
judges." Id.
149. See supra notes 143-44.
150. See Petition at 5, Gill. The Petition does not reveal how the discovery was made.
151. Id. at 5-7.
152. See § 5/2-1001(a)(1) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Involvement of judge. When the judge is a party or interested in the action, or
his or her testimony is material to either of the parties to the action, or he or she is
related to or has been counsel for any party in regard to the matter in controversy.
In any such situation a substitution of judge may be awarded by the court with or
without the application of either party.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-1001(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1992); see also § 5/2-1001(a)(3) which
provides:
Substitution for cause. When cause exists.
(i) Each party shall be entitled to a substitution or substitutions of judge for
cause.
(ii) Every application for substitution of judge for cause shall be made by peti-
tion, setting forth the specific cause for substitution and praying a substitution of
judge. The petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the applicant.
(iii) Upon the filing of a petition for substitution of judge for cause, a hearing
to determine whether the cause exists shall be conducted as soon as possible by a
judge other than the judge named in the petition.
ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 735, 5/2-1001(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
153. See § 5/2-1001(a)(2) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in part:
"Substitution as of right. When a party timely exercises his or her right to a substitution without
cause as provided in this paragraph (2). (i) Each party shall be entitled to one substitution of judge
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dismiss filed lawsuits.1 54 It is not clear, then, why the attorneys in the
Mayer, Brown case specifically rejected some or all of these options.'15
Also unclear is what kind of judge the attorneys were shopping for.'56
Although the attorneys and other members of the firm publicly stated
that they were simply "looking for 'a fair and even-minded judge,' "17
others have opined, that the attorneys really wanted a Catholic judge. 5 1
without cause as a matter of right." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-1001(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd
1992).
154. See § 5/2-1001.5(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:
A change of venue in any civil action may be had when the court determines
that any party may not receive a fair trial in the court in which the action is pending
because the inhabitants of the county are prejudiced against the party, or his or her
attorney, or the adverse party has an undue influence over the minds of the
inhabitants.
ILL. ANN.. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-1001.5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992); see also § 5/2-1009 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in part:
Voluntary dismissal. (a) The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing
begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or each such party's attorney,
and upon payment of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any
defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the cause.
(b) The court may hear and decide a motion that has been filed prior to a
motion filed under subsection (a) of this Section when that prior filed motion, if
favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a final disposition of the cause.
(c) After trial or hearing begins, the plaintiff may dismiss, only on terms fixed
by the court (1) upon filing a stipulation to that effect signed by the defendant, or (2)
on motion specifying the ground for dismissal, which shall be supported by affidavit
or other proof.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 § 5/2-1009 (Smith-Hurd 1992). There is no statute, court rule, or case
law in Illinois requiring that a refiled case be reassigned to the original judge. This is unlike rules
in some states that require any matter refiled in the same court to be assigned to the originally
selected judge. See, for example, Smith v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., No. 84-Civ.-911 1-CSH, 1985 WL
561 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1985), where the court stated:
Rule 4(b) of the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges is
designed to prevent 'shopping' by litigants among the Judges of this Bench. The
rule provides in pertinent part:
'An action, case or proceeding may not be dismissed and thereafter refiled for
the purpose of obtaining a different judge. If an action, case or proceeding, or
one essentially the same, is dismissed and refiled, it shall be assigned to the
same judge. It is the duty of every attorney appearing to bring the facts of the
refiling to the attention of the clerk.'
155. The attorneys clearly were aware of the options of changing venue and voluntarily
dismissing the lawsuit. See, e.g., Petition, at 4, Gill; see also Bailey, supra note 143, at 26.
156. Judge Arthur Dunne, who presided over the attorneys' disciplinary hearing, never asked
this question. "I wasn't interested, . . . It wasn't important to me[,)" the judge said. Nachman,
supra note 143, at 26.
157. Id.
158. Id Although another partner at Mayer, Brown dismissed this theory as "complete,
unadulterated bullshit," there were only three Catholic judges on the court. Id. Moreover,
although "one of the judges they drew, Aaron Jaffe, was among the most highly rated Chancery
Court judges by the Chicago Council of Lawyers when he was last evaluated in 1992 ... Gill
rejected him anyway." Id. Judge Dunne stated he had heard a theory with a slight variation. He
had been told that the attorneys were looking for an Irish judge. Id.
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Similar cases exist. 5 9 In Standing Committee on Discipline v.
Yagman,160 for example, the filing attorney was suspended from practic-
ing law before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia for one month for filing five virtually identical lawsuits within
eighteen minutes and subsequently dismissing all but one. 16' Unfortu-
nately, no known empirical data exist to show how often attorneys have
tried-successfully or unsuccessfully-to circumvent anti-judge-shop-
ping rules. Although the Mayer, Brown case was the first of its kind in
Illinois, 62 the Cook County Circuit Court Chancery Division adopted a
procedure, effective January 1, 1995, requiring all newly filed cases to
be investigated for similar conduct. 163  Notice, though, that in both
Mayer, Brown and Yagman the attorneys were punished for their con-
duct.16' Yet, we generally do not see the same treatment in either the
law-shopping or jury-shopping contexts. Why?
C. Why The Difference?
Courts consistently treat judge-shopping as an impermissible form
of shopping for justice. 165 Indeed, random assignment rules are specifi-
159. See, e.g., John MacCormack, Expensive Shopping, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 1995 (discussing
the case of two attorneys who were fined $ 10,000 each for filing the same lawsuit 17 times in two
days, varying only the plaintiffs' names); Lane v. City of Emeryville, No. CV-93-01228-JPV
(N.D. Cal. July 30, 1993), vacated on other grounds, 56 F.3d 71 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1995) (attorney
sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for judge-shopping by dismissing and refiling a complaint);
Mississippi Bar v. Strauss, 601 So. 2d 840 (Miss. 1992) (same); Grievance Adm'r v. August, 475
N.W.2d 256, 258 (Mich. 1991) (attorney's romantic relationship with court clerk led to attorney's
attempt "to manipulate the blind-draw system for assigning judges .... ").
160. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, No. CV 82-5412-HBT, Stipulation Re
Settlement and Order (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1983).
161. Yagman, No. CV-82-5412-HBT, at 1-2. Yagman differed slightly from the Mayer, Brown
case. Yagman named different plaintiffs in each of his five lawsuits. See James S. Granelli,
Shopping For a Judge, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1983, at 2, 28. Additionally, Yagman's explanation,
for what otherwise appeared to be an attempt to foil California's rule on random assignment of
judges, differed. After all five actions were filed, Yagman said, four of the five" 'plaintiffs chose
not to go forward with the suits because they didn't like the judges they got.' " Id. at 28.
In addition to being suspended, Yagman was fined $500 and ordered to perform 25 hours of
pro bono work. Yagman, No. CV-82-5412-HBT, at 4; see also Standing Comm. on Discipline v.
Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order), rev'd, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
162. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 143; Rooney, supra note 13.
163. See Duncan, supra note 143. No similar rule to discover law-shoppers or jury-shoppers
can be found.
164. See supra notes 151, 160-61, and accompanying text.
165. See In re Anwiler, 958 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 236 (1992);
In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special
Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 1296, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988); Ouachita Nat'l
Bank v. TOSCO Corp., 686 F.2d 1291, 1300 (8th Cir. 1982); Kelley v. Metro County Bd. of
Educ., 479 F.2d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 1973) (McCree, J., concurring); United States v. El-Gabrowny,
844 F. Supp. 955, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D.
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cally designed to prevent judge-shopping. 166 A contrary policy would
"imperil the perceived ability of the judicial system to decide cases with-
out regard to persons." 167 Courts have reasoned that allowing judge-
shopping would invite public skepticism of the ability to receive justice
in our court system and would cheapen the judicial process. 168 Thus,
while the discipline imposed for judge-shopping varies from court to
court169-an apparently unchangeable reality as long as different judges
are evaluating conduct' 7°-judge-shopping is still " 'universally con-
demned' "171 by the courts.
17 2
Mass. 1992); In re Betts, 143 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1992); McCann v.
Communications Design Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1506, 1522 (D. Conn. 1991); Avitia v. Metropolitan
Club of Chicago, Inc., No. 88-C-6965, 1990 WL 205278, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 1990); In re
Singh, 123 F.R.D. 140, 148-49 (D.N.J. 1988); In re Letters Rogatory, 661 F. Supp. 1168, 1172
(E.D. Mich. 1987); Raffe v. Citibank, N.A., No. 84-C-0305, 1987 WL 10825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
May 1, 1987); In re Westfall, 73 B.R. 186, 192 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986); In re Crisp, 64 B.R.
351, 356 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); Smith v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., No. 84-CIV-9111-CSH, 1985 WL
561, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1985); Alberti v. General Motors Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1024, 1025
(D.D.C. 1984); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D. Conn. 1983), appeal dismissed,
770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986); Dee v. Institutional Networks
Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mavis v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 408 F.
Supp. 55, 62 (C.D. Calif. 1975); Hader v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 566 N.E.2d 736, 740
(Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
166. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
167. Mason, 916 F.2d at 386; see also Burke, supra note 141 ("Forum-shopping--directing
cases toward or away from specific judges on the basis of their perceived prejudices toward
certain crimes or litigating personalities-is anathema in judicial circles because it tends to
undermine the image of judicial impartiality."). Indeed, judges take an oath that requires them to
adjudicate cases "solely on the facts admitted into evidence, in accordance with applicable law,
without regard to identity of parties or their attorneys." In re Betts, 143 B.R. at 1021.
168. Westfall, 73 B.R. at 192; Crisp, 64 B.R. at 356.
169. In the Mayer, Brown case, the Cook County Circuit Court fined the offending lawyers
$3,000 and "censured" them. Petition to Impose Discipline on Consent, at 2, 5, 7, In re Gill and
Marks, Comm'n Nos. 94-CH-837 & 838 (Il. filed Dec. 16, 1994). Censure is defined as "[ain
official reprimand or condemnation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (6th ed. 1990). Also, the
Mayer, Brown law firm imposed sanctions, including 300 hours of pro bono service and $55,000
in contributions to charitable organizations. Petition, at 6, Gill. For similar conduct, the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California suspended attorney Yagman from practicing
law for one month, and ordered him to pay a $500 fine and to perform 25 hours of pro bono
service. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, No. CV 82-512-HBT, Stipulation Re
Settlement and Order, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1983); see also MacCormack, supra note 159.
170. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
171. Lane v. City of Emeryville, No. 93-16646, 1995 WL 298614, at * 2 (9th Cir. May 16,
1995) (citations omitted).
172. Although the courts condemn judge-shopping, discipline for that conduct is not always
imposed. See, e.g., In re Anwiler, 958 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 236
(1992); Jones v. City of Buffalo, 867 F. Supp. 1155, 1162-63 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Avitia v.
Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., No. 88-C-6965, 1990 WL 205278, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13,
1990); Raffe v. Citibank, N.A., No. 84-C-0305, 1987 WL 10825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 1987);
Smith v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., No 84-CIV-911 1-CSH, 1985 WL 561, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1995);
In Re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1242-43 (D. Conn. 1983); Hader v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.
Co., 566 N.E.2d 736, 740-41 (11. Ct. App. 1991). Consider also Murray v. Sevier, 145 F.R.D.
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When the issue is shopping for laws or juries, however, universal
condemnation is far from the norm. While thousands of cases contain
general unsupported dicta criticizing forum-shopping as wrong, 173 our
judicial system, in practice, supports shopping for juries and laws. 174
Opponents of law-shopping argue that law-shopping undermines state
substantive law; 175 overburdens the courts, disrupts efficiency, and
causes unnecessary expense; 176 manipulates the court system's loop-
holes and creates public doubt about fairness in the system; 177 and high-
lights differences and inconsistencies among the states, while
"expos[ing] the tension between the ideal of the rule of law and the
reality of a system created and administered by human beings.' 1 78 But
proponents of law-shopping argue that plaintiff, as "master of his
forum,"' 17 9 has a right to shop for laws; 80 thus, it is an appropriate litiga-
tion strategy. 181 Indeed, it is said to be "no more an evil than any other
563 (D. Kan. 1993). In Murray, members of an unincorporated association of anglers brought six
lawsuits against the same group of defendants. After reviewing the judges assigned to the actions,
the members dismissed all but one of the suits. Although the court's opinion clearly recognized
the judge-shopping attempt, no sanction was imposed. Id. at 596. The "preferred" judge,
however, re-assigned the case to another judge. Id. at 565.
173. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987);
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-37 (1964). Westlaw offers access to thousands of cases
that mention the term "forum-shopping." Although most of these cases contain references to the
dangers of forum-shopping, very few provide any analysis to support that conclusion. Note, supra
note 4, at 1681. Further, courts apply the term "forum-shopping" selectively to suit their
purposes. "A court will call a practice 'forum shopping' when it wishes to paint it as an unsavory
machination designed to thwart public policy and achieve an unmerited goal. By contrast, it will
avoid the label when it considers the reasons behind the forum selection reasonable or justified."
Id. at 1683 (footnote omitted). If there really is nothing wrong with forum-shopping, why do so
many cases start from the premise that forum-shopping is wrong?
174. See supra notes 20-81, 94, 98, 106, and accompanying text; North Star Steel Co. v.
Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 1927, 1931-32 (1995); American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 993
(1994) (Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that by sanctioning a state law that prevents
a defendant's use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in claims brought in state court under
the Jones Act, "the Court condones the forum shopping and disuniformity that the admiralty
jurisdiction is supposed to prevent"); Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990); Keeton
v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
175. Note, supra note 4, at 1684.
176. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 20, at 666-67.
177. Brown, supra note 20, at 668; Note, supra note 4, at 1684.
178. Note, supra note 4, at 1686.
179. Brown, supra note 20, at 669.
180. See, e.g., Conlon v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., No. 94-CIV-0609-KMW, 1995 WL 20321, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1995).
181. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779; Moorco Int'l, Inc. v. Elsag Bailey Process Automation, N.V.,
881 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1995). In Moorco, in response to a defense contention of
fraudulent joinder, in that a co-party was joined in order to secure a state court forum and thus
defeat federal diversity jurisdiction, the court stated: "[T]here is nothing improper about
formulating and executing an effective litigation strategy, including selecting the most favorable
forum for the client's case. Thus, [the non-diverse defendant's] joinder cannot be deemed
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tactical determination a party makes in its behalf."' 18 2 Some contend that
venue-shopping is an attorney's job,'83 indeed, that attorneys are ethi-
cally bound to venue-shop, 84 lest they find themselves defending mal-
practice actions.8 5 Others simply conclude that there is nothing wrong
with filing a lawsuit in any state as long as venue is proper and personal
jurisdiction over the defendant exists.'8 6 One court even concludes that
forum-shopping "is as American as the Constitution, peremptory chal-
lenges to jurors, and our dual system of state and federal courts."'8 7 So
while our judicial system appears to disdain those who would shop for
judges, it generally looks favorably upon those who shop for juries or
laws. But if judge-shopping cheapens the judicial process and erodes
public confidence in the court system, 8 why doesn't the quest for
favorable juries or the quest for favorable laws have the same effect?
The judge-shopping decisions are actually quite contradictory. On
the one hand, the opinions promulgate the fiction that judges preside
neutrally and without bias over each case simply by being faithful to
their oath of office. 189 On the other hand, we all know that judges are
fraudulent [simply] because [the plaintiff] finds it advantageous to pursue these... claims in...
state court."
182. Kahn v. Wien, No. CIV-86-2416-RJD, 1989 WL 65449, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 1989)
(quoting Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
183. See id. at *4; Conlon, 1995 WL 20321, at *3 ("There is nothing per se improper in an
attorney's choosing between available venues based on his calculation that the selection of one
may benefit his client because the courts in that district may be more favorably disposed to his
legal theory.").
184. See Juenger, Forum Shopping, supra note 110, at 570; Juenger, What's Wrong?, supra
note 110, at 12-13; Opeskin, supra note 18, at 14-15, 27; Note, supra note 4, at 1690. Consider
also CASAD, supra note 110, at 1:
[T]o the extent that legal rules permit a different outcome in a case when it is
brought in court A as compared to court B, it can be said that there is a policy of
permitting forum shopping. In the latter instance, a lawyer has done nothing
unethical or reprehensible in choosing the forum that is most advantageous to the
client's case. Indeed, it could be said that it is part of the advocate's responsibility to
seek the best place to try the case.
185. Juenger, Forum Shopping, supra note 110, at 572.
186. See supra notes 100, 121. Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated in Ferens v. John Deere
Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) Congress-via liberal venue provisions-gives plaintiffs the right to
forum-shop. Id. at 527. If a given law specifically allows the conduct at issue, how can the
conduct be improper? See also Juenger, What's Wrong?, supra note 110:
"Forum-shopping" is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if
you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in
which he thinks his case can be most favorably presented: this should be a matter
neither for surprise nor for indignation.
Id. at 12.
187. McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 155, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992).
189. For two such opinions, see Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1160 (1994)
(Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring) ("Judges, if faithful to their oath,
approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective disposition. They understand
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not equal-not in intelligence, experience, or perception. 190 More
importantly, we also know "that, by putting the black robe on, a person
doesn't change his or her personality; [judges] bring their biases,
prejudices, their good qualities, and bad qualities with them."' 91 Indeed,
the very existence of laws allowing parties to seek the removal of judges
for cause demonstrates that the power of the judicial oath is not enough
to ensure neutrality. 192 Moreover, we acknowledge that the oath does
not guarantee an open mind when presidents nominate federal judges to
the bench. When we speak of "Reagan-Bush" appointees or "Clinton"
appointees, we are not merely noting that a particular person was nomi-
nated by a particular president. Rather, we are referring to our belief-
indeed, the belief of the nominator-that the appointee shares (or is
thought to share) most, if not all, of the political, social, and economic
beliefs of the appointor. 193 No one really believes that the oath elimi-
nates partiality. Thus, our judicial system punishes judge-shopping
because if judge-shopping were allowed the public would conclude that
the judicial system was unfair and biased and the public would lose con-
fidence in the court system; our courts also punish judge-shopping for
their duty to render decisions upon a proper record and to disregard earlier judicial contacts with a
case or party.) and In re Betts, 143 B.R. 1016, 1021 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1992).
190. See, e.g., Judge-Shopping? Why Not?, N.J. L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 14 (editorial arguing
that judges individual differences make judge-shopping inevitable).
The fact is that every judge is not capable of presiding over every case. A few may
be incapable of presiding over most cases. Judicial decisions are affected by the
knowledge, intelligence, dedication and philosophy of the deciding judge. These
characteristics vary with the individual. Criminal sentencing practices illustrate the
point. Judges tested with identical hypothetical questions often exhibit striking
differences. In one county, years ago, convicted marijuana users sentenced by one
judge went to jail always, sentenced by another, never. What lawyer, properly
representing such a defendant, would fail to judge-shop?
Id. Recall the rejected arguments of attorneys "caught" judge-shopping. They said they were
seeking a fair-minded judge or one more equipped to handle the complexity of the case. See
supra note 157 and accompanying text. Similarly, the attorney caught filing 17 lawsuits in two
days justified his actions, saying, "My ultimate responsibility is to my clients. What I think we
were doing is getting the best, most experienced court to hear a toxic tort case." MacCormack,
supra note 159, at A4.
191. Vitt, supra note 5, at 129; see also Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary:
The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995) (citing
the authors' statistical data in arguing that there is "surprisingly little evidence that the identity of
the judge hearing a particular case influences the case's outcome"). Indeed, in other contexts,
many people believe that diversity on the bench is good for justice and society. See, e.g., Georgia
Dullea, Women as Judges: Nationwide, Their Numbers Increase-Some Observers Think Male-
Female Differences in Viewing Issues Will Change Courts, L.A. DAILY J., May 23, 1984, at 4.
192. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
193. See, for example, Beverly B. Cook, Should We Change Our Method of Selecting Judges?,
JUDGEs' J. Fall 1981, at 20, 22, where the author stated: "The enduring reality of political
considerations was epitomized in a statement by President Reagan during the 1980 campaign.
When a reporter asked for his standards for choosing a justice he said: 'You look for a certain
compatibility with your own philosophy.'"
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fear that judge-shopping would undermine the image of judicial imparti-
ality. 94 There is no conclusive evidence to support these beliefs. Yet
these are the reasons courts express in opposition to judge-shopping.
Assuming, arguendo, that these beliefs are true, should they form
the basis for distinguishing between shopping for judges on the one hand
and shopping for juries and laws on the other? In other words, if it is
inappropriate to allow a party to choose the judge she believes most
favorable to her cause, shouldn't it also be inappropriate to allow her to
choose the law or jury pool she believes most favorable to her cause?
Wouldn't either scenario have a negative effect on public perceptions
about justice and cause a loss of confidence in the system?" 5 This
author thinks so. Further, this author does not think that the average
layperson distinguishes shopping for a judge from shopping for a jury or
for laws.1 96 The author has no empirical data to support this opinion.
She can only submit that her conversations with attorneys and layper-
sons show that, while the attorneys can make arguments that justify the
distinction, laypersons generally do not make the distinction. For exam-
ple, while the vast majority of both groups condemned the attorneys'
194. See supra notes 165-68; see also In re Crisp, 64 B.R. 351, 356 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986)
("The crippling potential for justice is obvious."); cf. Liteky, 114 S. Ct at 1162 (" '[J]ustice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.' ") (emphasis added)
(alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte McCarthy, I K.B. 256, 259 (1923)) (" '[J]ustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
195. See Note, supra note 4, at 1684 n.58 (suggesting that, because venue practices are not
-commonly known the public cannot have a negative impression of them). But like judge-
shopping cases, law- and jury-shopping cases also make headlines. See, e.g., newspaper and
magazine articles cited supra notes 44, 48, 51-54, 56, & 69; see also Claudia MacLachlan, Move
to Texas Spurs A Spat Over Venue-Lawyers Seeking Lenient Jurors Start a Tug-of- War, NAT'L
L.J., June 13, 1994, at BI.
196. Consider how lawyers have redefined the word "ethics" as an example of the differing
views of laypersons and lawyers. The word "ethics" is defined as "[o]f or relating to moral action,
conduct, motive or character .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (6th ed. 1990). Yet the term
"legal ethics" has a different definition: "Usages and customs among members of the legal
profession, involving their moral and professional duties toward one another, toward clients, and
toward the courts." Id. at 894 (emphases added); see also Peter Margulies, Review Essay,
Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1139, 1139 (1995) ("Legal ethics, as
traditionally understood, explains why actions that violate our sense of ordinary ethics ... are
appropriate from the standpoint of professional roles."); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. I, 9 (1975). Wasserstrom states:
(For most lawyers, most of the time, pursuing the interests of one's clients is an
attractive and satisfying way to live in part just because the moral world of the
lawyer is a simpler, less complicated, and less ambiguous world than the moral
world of ordinary life. There is, I think, something quite seductive about being able
to turn aside so many ostensibly difficult moral dilemmas and decisions with the
reply: but that is not my concern; my job as a lawyer is not to judge the rights and
wrong of the client or the cause; it is to defend as best I can my client's interests.
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judge-shopping attempt in the Mayer, Brown case, these groups split
when the issue involved the attorney's conduct in Ferens. Virtually all
plaintiff attorneys vigorously defended the law-shopping in Ferens,
while defense attorneys generally deplored it. Virtually every layperson,
however-even law students-could not believe that the Supreme Court
allowed the attorney in Ferens to "get away with" the law-shopping
depicted there. 19 7 This informal survey, coupled with the author's own
beliefs, have strengthened the author's opinion that the current distinc-
tions are unsatisfying.
III. REEVALUATING THE CURRENT APPROACH TO VENUE
A. For the Sake of "Public Confidence"
The judicial system seems to deplore judge-shopping in every form.
Although some judge-shopping goes undetected, 9 8 once discovered, it
will generally be punished. 199 Jury- and law-shopping, however, are
viewed differently. The legal community generally believes that it is
good to seek favorable courts and laws.200 With some minor excep-
tions,20' the legal community does not seem to care how those results
are obtained. But all shopping-for judges, laws, and juries-should be
considered equally deplorable. We should not condone the quest for
favorable laws and juries simply because the methods used to secure
them are within the bounds of the law, while deploring the quest to
secure a judge of choice, regardless of the method used, because judge-
shopping somehow is just plain wrong.
Law- and jury-shopping not only erode public confidence in the
court system, but they also reward manipulation and exploitation of
loopholes.20 2 If the appearance of justice, the integrity of the profession,
197. The phrase "get away with" is not the author's, but rather was repeatedly used by
laypersons upon hearing the author's account of Ferens. Although all the listeners understood that
the double forum-shopping in Ferens was legal, the question remained as to why it was
considered legal. Similarly, although the method employed in Ferens to secure favorable law was
within the bounds of our judicial system's current interpretation of venue choices-in contrast to
the Mayer, Brown case, where the method to secure the judge of choice was not within legal
bounds-this does not satisfactorily address the relevance of the similarities. Both cases involved
laws that prohibited the sought-after results. In Ferens, Pennsylvania law barred plaintiffs' non-
contract claim; in the Mayer, Brown case, a random-assignment-of-judges procedure prohibited
the attorneys from attempting to choose the judge of choice. And both cases involved
circumvention of those rules.
198. Consider the methods ofjudge-shopping detailed supra notes 134-161 and accompanying
text. Obviously, not all judge-shopping can be eradicated; some will always slip through the
cracks.
199. See supra notes 151, 160, and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 20-41, 43-81, 94-95, 98, 106, and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
202. Neither does such shopping provide much predictability to lawyers making forum-
1996)
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and public confidence in the judicial system mean anything, we should
move away from the view that shopping for juries and laws are "rights."
Obtaining the best bargain for one's dollar is natural.203 But problems
regarding confidence in the system and the integrity of the profession
arise when this behavior is carried over into the court system. The legal
profession is in serious need of a boost.2 4 In the name of advocacy, it
shopping decisions either. See supra part II.A.4 for examples of the conflicting signals litigators
get every day; see also Gideon Kanner, Shopping for Justice: Growing Reliance on Private
Judging Reflects Shortfalls in Court System, PA. L. WKLY., June 13, 1994, at 6. Professor Kanner
argues that, because the law applicable to a given lawsuit depends on where the lawsuit is filed,
and because of open conflict among courts over the interpretation of law, "litigants are
increasingly feeling alienated from the courts which are more and more perceived as failing in
their primary function of principled dispute resolution, heedless of the law, and enamored of
ideological sallies or even personal ad hoc result orientation." Id. at 6, 27. Attorneys simply must
take a chance. Indeed, consider how many litigators decided not to engage in the kind of law-
shopping condoned in Ferens before that decision was handed down because they were afraid
such conduct would lead to sanctions. Before Ferens, some doubted that an attorney would even
attempt to do what the plaintiff's attorney in Ferens did. See, e.g., Currivan, supra note 41, at
154-58.
But if the attorney gambles and gambles right, then both the attorney and the client are
victorious; the only real "loser" may be the system as a whole. But if the attorney gambles and
gambles wrong, then the ramifications of such conduct can range from nothing at all to discipline
of some sort. Consider the legal malpractice implications to the attorney engaging in or refusing
to engage in forum-shopping. As defined, "legal malpractice" "[c]onsists of failure of an attorney
to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess and exercise in performance of tasks which they undertake, and when such failure
proximately causes damage it gives rise to an action in tort." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th
ed. 1990); see also DuKE N. STERN, AN AtrORNEY's GUIDE TO MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 210-245
(1977); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run upon
Action Against Attorney for Malpractice, 32 A.L.R. 4th 260, 268-345 (1984). So when deciding
what to shop for, how to shop, and where to shop, the attorney should keep in mind potential
malpractice liability. Recall the concern, for example, when the Illinois courts were flooded with
newly filed lawsuits after word of a pending bill limiting noneconomic damages hit the press. See
supra notes 54-55. Explaining the flood, a nationally prominent personal injury lawyer said,
" 'Every lawyer who isn't going to be guilty of malpractice will want to have their lawsuit on
file.' " Rob Thomas, Illinois Bill Would Limit Damages in Lawsuits, ST. Louis PosT-Disp., Mar.
3, 1995, at 1 A, 6A. Indeed, opponents of peremptory challenges of federal judges believe that
"[i]f the system is available, attorneys feel compelled to invoke the challenge for even the slightest
of reasons, fearing that if they do not they will be open to malpractice suits by clients who are
unsuccessful in their litigation." Larry Berkson & Sally Dorfmann, Judicial Peremptory
Challenges: The Controversy, STATE CT. J., Summer 1985, at 12, 14 (footnote omitted); see also
Committee on Federal Courts, A Proposal for Peremptory Challenges of Federal Judges in Civil
and Criminal Cases, 36 THE RECORD 231, 237 (1981) ("Inherent in these administrative
objections is the stated belief that the filing of challenges would become commonplace on the part
of defense attorneys in criminal cases, who would be concerned that they would be charged with
failing to provide effective assistance of counsel if they did not frequently exercise the
challenge.") (footnote omitted).
203. Judges, for example, shop for the best law clerks on the market. See Marcia Chambers,
Clerk-Shopping Shows Judges at Their Worst, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 4, 1988, at 13. And law
professors shop for the "best" placement of their articles. See Lisa Anderson, Law Journals
Attack 'Shopping' of Manuscripts, N.Y. TiMEs, July 12, 1995, at B6.
204. Witness the public dissatisfaction in the criminal law area resulting from the O.J. Simpson
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has virtually abandoned civility20 5 and the notion that lawyers are
officers of the court.20 6 The goal today is to win and to win at any cost.
The practice of law is becoming a game, and the notion of the lawyer as
hired gun is alive and well. 207  But it does not have to be this way.
Nothing requires the profession to maintain its current course. The legal
profession can do little things, such as narrowing procedural loopholes
in the court system, to aid in restoring public trust in the system.
Although limiting lawyers' ability to shop for juries or laws is not,
alone, enough to reverse the public perception of the judicial system, it
would help.
Most courts now allow law- and jury-shopping, °8 even if some do
so reluctantly.20 9 If the proposed shopping venture cannot pass muster
trial. See, e.g., Steven Keeva, Circus-like Trial Colors Expectation: Lawyers Must Re-educate a
More Cynical Public, A.B.A. J. Nov. 1995, at 48C. The public has concluded, among other
things, that justice can be bought. See, e.g., Charles B. Rosenberg, The Law After O.J, A.B.A. J.
June 1995, at 72, 73; Steven Keeva, Storm Warnings, A.B.A. J. June 1995, at 77. The public also
has become disgusted with lawyer's tricks, loopholes, and manipulation. Id. at 77-78. Clearly
public confidence in the court system can use a boost. See, e.g., Joe Holleman, Lawyers Not
Liked, Survey Shows. ST. Louis PosT-DisP., Apr. 20, 1995, at lB.
205. For an interesting article on the lack of civility among lawyers in the profession today, see
Gail D. Cox, Lawyers Still Wage Uncivil War: Civility Codes Are in Vogue, but Insults, Threats,
Lies and Hardball Haven't Stopped, NAT'L L. J., July 17, 1995, at Al; see also James E. Brill,
Save the Whales: Among the Many Worthy Causes, Let's Also Save the Profession, A.B.A. J. Oct.
1993, at 110; Kathleen P. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo
Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 751 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, ABA Eyes Hardball Play,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A21-22 (reporting on an American Bar Association plan to study
litigation tactics); James Podgers, Changes Sought in Civil Justice System, 80 A.B.A. J., Feb.
1994, at 111-12 (quoting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's call to "put civility back in our
profession").
206. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993); see also MacCormack, supra note 159 (attorney is quoted saying his primary
responsibility is to his client).
207. For interesting reading on the legal profession's obsession with victory and the
gamesmanship mentality that abounds, see generally Kronman, supra note 206, and THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983); Kenneth Lasson,
Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 BOSTON U. L. Rv. 723
(1994). See also John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U.
L.Q. 429 (1976). In discussing the deficiencies contained in the Model Code, infra note 301,
Professor Flynn stated:
By ignoring the lawyer's relation to himself and instead emphasizing only the
lawyer's relation to others and the profession, the Code allows lawyers to rationalize
many forms of conduct which would otherwise transgress their duties to self and,
consequently, widely held moral values. The emphasis on duty to others leads
naturally and dangerously to the "hired-gun" model for deciding ethical questions.
The rules that define immorality may reinforce the dangers of amorality, and allow
an attorney to justify almost any conduct that promotes the interests of the client.
Id. at 436.
208. See supra notes 20-41, 43-81, 94-95, 98, 106, and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Muldoon v. Tropiton Furniture Co., I F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV-A-91-3779, 1992 WL 167030, at *5 (E.D. La. 1992).
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in one jurisdiction, it certainly can in another.2" So the incentive to
seek out the jurisdiction handing out the "pass" always exists.2 1 Find-
ing more acceptable limits on law- and jury-shopping is important.
Once those limits are determined, even if lawyers continue to shop for
favorable juries or favorable laws, a court truly will be at liberty to
determine "whether the choice of forum is a proper one under the
law.
2 12
B. Through the Prism of Convenience to All
If the author is correct that the reasons courts advance against
judge-shopping apply with equal force to jury- and law-shopping, one
question still remains: How do we align the treatment of jury- and law-
shopping closer to that of judge-shopping? 2 3  The prime solution is
already at the disposal of every court in America: Analyze venue
choices keeping in mind the purpose of venue-to find a convenient
forum for trial.
Before discussing this approach, however, several other, less via-
ble, options must be addressed. First, one might argue for elimination of
choice: A party could file suit in only one jurisdiction. This is not really
a solution. It might be impossible,214 or unfair,215 to identify only one
state, or one jurisdiction within a state, where venue would be proper.
210. See, for example, Kanner, supra note 202, at 6, where Professor Kanner observed:
We now confront a situation where intermediate appellate courts openly disagree
with one another, so that "the law" that is said to govern our lives depends on what
part of the state your client lives. The situation is no better in the federal courts
where we have grown accustomed to judges solemnly announcing that "it is the rule
in this circuit, that ..." In this circuit? Whatever happened to the sensible idea that
the purpose behind federal courts is to give us a coherent body of uniform,
nationwide federal law? Not only that, but in both state and federal jurisdictions,
the respective Supreme Courts are unable to resolve conflicts of decision and to
maintain the law as a reasonably clear guide to human conduct, so that confusion is
rampant.
211. That laws vary from state to state is a consequence of federalism. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT.
amend. X; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
212. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Micron Semiconductor, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 994, 996 (E.D. Tex.
1993) (emphasis added).
213. It could certainly be argued that judge-shopping should be accorded treatment similar to
that currently given to law- and jury-shopping. Because this argument does not appeal to the
author, she does not explore it in this article.
214. Suppose, for example, we identify the state of plaintiff's residence as the only proper
venue. What happens if plaintiff is injured in another state but personal jurisdiction cannot be had
over the defendant in plaintiff's state of residence?
215. What if we identified the place of injury as the only proper venue? Aside from re-
creating the horrors experienced with that notion in the choice-of-law area, see generally EUGENE
F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1992), plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
-injustice where the place of injury is far from the plaintiff's residence and plaintiff does not have
the resources to litigate in such a distant forum.
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This is particularly true today in light of the multijurisdictional nature of
many lawsuits. Further, it is simply impractical to eliminate all forms of
venue-shopping. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit has remarked:
In a perfect judicial system forum-shopping would be paradoxical.
The same results would obtain in every forum and after every type of
trial. But the actual litigation process is not a laboratory in which the
same result is obtained after every test.... In recognition both of this
and of the nature of the adversary, client-serving process, we tolerate
a certain amount of manipulation without inquiry into motive.2 6
So we must live with choice. But this does not mean, however, that we
should allow the system to be tested daily to see how much choice it can
withstand.217
Others might propose that courts and/or legislatures devise a list of
216. McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1262 (5th Cir. 1983). Consider also
the effect of varying choice-of-law rules in the quest for more favorable law. See, e.g., CASAD,
supra note 110, at 2:
If the law of choice of law were a matter of federal law, applicable uniformly
throughout the country, then there would not be many situations in which different
substantive law would apply to a case if it should be brought in state A rather than
state B. But choice of law in the United States is state law, and at this point in time
there is probably more variation among the states in the area of choice of law than
there ever has been in our history. There are, accordingly, many situations in which
different substantive law will be applied to a case if the suit is brought in state A
rather than state B. So long as those differences exist, forum choice may have a
profound effect on the outcome of a case.
217. Consider another recent attempt to expand use of the federal transfer statutes.
Specifically, in Spar, Inc. v. Information Resources, Inc., 956 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1992), plaintiff
filed an action in a New York state court for breach of an employment contract. After removing
to federal court, defendant sought to dismiss the suit as barred under the applicable New York
statute of limitations. Plaintiff then sought a transfer from New York to Illinois, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406, where the applicable statute of limitations had not expired. Section 1406(a) provides:
"The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or
division in which it could have been brought." Id. at 393. Venue was clearly proper in New
York. Id. at 392. Thus, a literal reading of § 1406 might lead one to wonder why plaintiff moved
for transfer under that statute. Plaintiff most likely sought a § 1406(a) transfer for two key
reasons: 1) Many courts of proper venue have, notwithstanding the language of § 1406, used that
section to transfer cases from one proper venue to another, see, e.g., id. at 394; and 2) transfers
under § 1406-based on the assumption that venue in the transferor court was improper-
normally result in the application of the law of the transferee forum. See, e.g., Smith, supra note
20, at 200; Currivan, supra note 41, at 159-63.
Plaintiff certainly could have sought transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See supra note 26
for the text of § 1404(a). The problem for the plaintiff, however, was that New York's choice-of-
law rules would have followed the plaintiff to Illinois. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S.
516, 519 (1990). Thus, a danger may have existed that New York's statute of limitations would
have followed plaintiff to Illinois. Plaintiff sought to circumvent Ferens, but the attempted
expansion did not work. The Second Circuit, recognizing plaintiff's motion for transfer as an
inappropriate form of forum-shopping, upheld the granting of defendant's summary judgment
motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. Spar, 956 F.2d at 395. But see Porter v.
Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing the identical maneuver).
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permissible and impermissible forms of forum-shopping. This approach
is not pursued here for three reasons. First, such a list would be impossi-
ble to reach consensus on. Second, even if such a list could be created,
some crafty lawyer might discover a loophole. Third, the purpose of this
Article is to encourage debate of law- and jury-shopping as legitimate
strategies.
Another approach might be to focus on the filing party's motives
and then impose sanctions against that party if the court determined that
the motive was to seek a more favorable jury or law. This approach has
already been suggested in other procedural areas of the law.21 8 While
this approach works well in theory, it would have dismal effects in prac-
tice. There is no proven method of getting inside someone's head.
Moreover, although some cases might be resolved easily,21 9 most would
be enigmatic.22°
A fourth, and highly desirable, approach would require legislative
action in the form of a call to Congress and state legislatures to amend
all venue laws to narrow the ability to make venue choices based upon
favorable juries or laws. Although this is an ideal solution, it is not
pursued in this Article because relief would be painfully slow in coming:
This solution would require legislative action by more than fifty autono-
mous and highly political bodies.
More importantly, though, nationwide legislative action is unneces-
sary: The tools for change are already at the courthouse steps. We need
only change how judges interpret venue laws. Viewing venue decisions
with the purpose of venue in mind will curtail the current wave of suc-
cessful quests for more favorable juries or laws by any lawful means.
True, reevaluating venue selections will not necessarily point to one
state or one jurisdiction within a state. Indeed, such reevaluation will
clearly require more judicial analysis when multiple states have contacts
with the litigation. Neither is there a guarantee that every court will
apply the same factors in the same way for determining the most conve-
nient venue. But our judicial system can resolve these issues. 22 ,
218. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 20, at 202-03 (arguing that the motives underlying a
plaintiff's request for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) should determine whether the law of the
transferor court should follow the plaintiff to the transferee court).
219. See. e.g., Ferens discussed supra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995), discussed supra note 123.
How would one ever determine whether plaintiff's counsel filed the lawsuit in federal court
knowing that the jurisdictional amount for diversity actions could not be met?
221. Under 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(a)(2) & (b)(2) (Supp. V 1993), courts must frequently determine
where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a given claim occurred. See
supra notes 13-14. Courts are already learning to struggle with similar inquiries. See, e.g.,




Furthermore, this approach will neither eliminate choice nor pre-
vent parties from maintaining litigation in jurisdictions that happen to
offer favorable juries or laws. For example, where multiple jurisdictions
have contacts with the litigation, if the plaintiff were to file the action in
the one state whose laws were most favorable, a court might easily
determine that, all things being equal, one venue is no more convenient
than any other. This should remain a viable option. Thus, the sugges-
tions here merely are designed to restrict the current unfettered ability of
plaintiffs to burden forums with little or no connection to the litigation.
Ultimately, it should become very difficult-even impossible-for a
plaintiff to litigate an action in New York when every connection with
that lawsuit is in California.222 The most viable solution, then, calls for
a focus on the purpose of venue.
Despite current views to the contrary, choice of venue is not a
Defendants' argument ignores the fact that under the 1990 Amendments to
(b)(2), a case need not be tried in the best place, but merely a place with substantial
contacts. The "'fact that substantial activities took place in district B does not
disqualify district A as proper venue as long as substantial activities took place in A,
too ... even if it is shown that the activities in B were more substantial.'"
Id. at 249 (citations omitted). This is not to say, however, that the place where a substantial part
of the events or omissions occurred should necessarily be the most convenient venue. One could
easily imagine an action arising in state X, although both plaintiff and defendant live in state Y; or
an action in which all parties and/or important witnesses have moved after the acts or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred. In these cases, it would not necessarily be appropriate to focus
on the place where a significant amount of the contacts occurred. For a study on the timing-of-
contacts issue as it relates to venue, see Christian E. Mammen, Note, Here Today, Gone
Tomorrow: The Timing of Contacts for Jurisdiction and Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, 78 COR-
NELL L. REV. 707 (1993), and Diane P. Wood, Comment, Federal Venue: Locating the Place
Where the Claim Arose, 54 TEx. L. REV. 392, 403-15 (1976), for the various approaches taken by
federal courts in determining the place where the "cause of action arose" within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1391 prior to the 1988 amendments. The 1988 Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 shifted
the focus from where the cause of action arose to where a substantial part of the events or omis-
sions giving rise to the claim occurred. See supra notes 13-14 for the text of § 1391 as it exists
today. See infra note 233 for the text of § 1391 prior to the 1988 amendments.
222. Consider Conlon v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., No. 94-CIV-0609-KMW, 1995 WL 20321, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 19, 1995), where, although plaintiff did not reside in New York, the accident did
not occur in New York, and New York had no connection with plaintiff or the subject matter of
the litigation, these facts were insufficient to convince the New York court "that plaintiff's filing
of [the] suit in [New York] should be deemed unworthy of any weight .. " See also Gauntt v.
United Ins. Co., No. 1940591, 1996 WL 55604, at *18 (Ala. Feb. 9, 1996) (Maddox, J.,
dissenting), where in disagreement with the majority's finding of proper venue, Judge Maddox
noted the following:
I close this dissent by asking this question: How can permitting 23 plaintiffs to sue
individual and corporate defendants in a county where none of the individual
plaintiffs and none of the individual defendants resides, and where none of the
alleged wrongful acts occurred, be "in the interest of justice"? It would seem to me
that the most convenient forums would be the counties where the individual
plaintiffs reside and where the corporate defendants apparently did the business that
led to these disputes, and where the alleged wrongful acts occurred.
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party's right. Federal venue statutes, as well as most state venue
laws,223 were not enacted to provide plaintiffs with plentiful venue
choices. The leading Supreme Court case on the purpose of the general
federal venue statutes, Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. ,224 ruled
that venue statutes were designed "to protect the defendant against the
risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial. '225
They were not designed "to give the plaintiff the right to select the place
of trial that best suits his convenience" nor "to give that party an unfet-
223. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 874 n.34 (5th
Cir. 1993) (stating that "[besides protecting] civil defendants from inconvenient forums, the
[Texas venue] rules strive to ensure that local matters are tried in local courts") (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994); Gross v. General Motors Corp., 528 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Mich.
1995) ("Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most
convenient forum.") (citations omitted); RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. v. Dunn, 642 N.E.2d 538,
540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("It is the general spirit and policy of many venue statutes to give the
defendant the right to have the action tried in the county of his or her residence. Such statutes are
also intended to provide a convenient, logical and orderly forum for litigation. ') (emphasis
added); see also Lowe v. Morrison, No. CA-88-192, 1989 WL 10071, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
1989); County of San Bernardino v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760, 766 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994); Barry Cook Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 571 So. 2d 61, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Tipton v.
Estate of Cusick, 651 N.E.2d 635, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Hill v. Hill, 575 So. 2d 886, 888 (La.
Ct. App. 1991); In re Lynn M., 540 A.2d 799, 804 (Md. 1988); Solum v. Solum, No. C4-93-1099,
1993 WL 480180, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1993); Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So. 2d
1149, 1157 (Miss. 1992); Judy v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 892 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994);
Team Bank v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 879 P.2d 779, 782 (N.M. 1994); Sherman v. Babylon Recycling
Ctr., Inc., 631 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); City of Danville v. Virginia State Water
Control Bd., 446 S.E.2d 466, 468 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Hronek v. St. Joseph's Children's Home,
866 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Wyo. 1994). But see Conner v. Willet, 91 So. 2d 225, 226-27 (Ala. 1956);
McClellan v. Kenai Peninsula Burough, 565 P.2d 175, 178 (Alaska 1977); Belcher v. Raines, 636
P.2d 1246, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Gibson v. Department of Revenue, 566 P.2d 1086, 1087
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Orsini, 445 A.2d 887, 890 (Conn. 1982); Delmarva Power & Light
Co. v. City of Seaford, 523 A.2d 973, 975 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Biddinger v. Fletcher, 162
S.E.2d 414, 417 (Ga. 1968); Alamida v. Wilson, 495 P.2d 585, 588 (Haw. 1972); Banning v.
Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 406 P.2d 802, 804 (Idaho 1965); Wilde v. Swanson, 548 A.2d 837, 843-
44 (Md. 1988); Lake County's Obligation v. Hutchin, 724 P.2d 183, 184-85 (Mont. 1986); State
Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Middlesex County Freeholders Bd., 502 A.2d 1188, 1191 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985); State v. Cote, 58 A.2d 749, 751 (N.H. 1948); Davis v. Smith, 209
S.E.2d 852, 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); North Valley Water Ass'n v. Northern Improvement Co.,
415 N.W.2d 492, 496 (N.D. 1987); Varketta v. General Motors Corp., 295 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1973); Lane v. Hughes, 408 P.2d 281, 285 (Okla. 1965); Mutzig v. Hope, 158 P.2d 110,
123 (Or. 1945); County Constr. Co. v. Livengood Constr. Corp., 142 A.2d 9, 13 (Pa. 1958); In re
Asbestosis Cases, 266 S.E.2d 773, 776 (S.C. 1980); Kreager v. Blomstrom Oil Co., 298 N.W.2d
519, 521 (S.D. 1980); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Hooper, 375 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1963); Gerdel v. Gerdel, 313 A,2d 8, 9 (Vt. 1973); Isho v. Angland, 397 P.2d 422, 423
(Wash. 1964); Brent v. Board of Trustees, 256 S.E.2d 432, 434-35 (W. Va. 1979); Voit v.
Madison Newspapers, Inc., 341 N.W.2d 693, 698 (Wis. 1984).
224. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
225. Id. at 184 (footnote omitted); see also National Micrographics Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A.,
Inc., 825 F. Supp. 671, 679 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 3801 at
257, 3826 at 4; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 722 F. Supp. 725, 727
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (also citing WRIGHT CT AL., supra note 42, § 3802 at 7).
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tered choice among a host of different districts. 2 2 6 Rather, the intent
was twofold: To protect the defendant against local bias and preju-
dice, 227 and, more importantly, to ensure the convenience of all wit-
nesses, and other relevant evidence;228 i.e., to try the litigation in "the
most convenient forum.
229
The intent of the Congress that originally enacted the general fed-
eral venue statutes remains controlling today, despite numerous amend-
ments to those statutes. 230  Many commentators believe that the
amendments were designed to widen venue choices. 23' This may be true,
but it does not necessarily follow that a plaintiff has an unlimited right to
226. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 184-85 (citation omitted); see also League of United Latin Am.
Citizens, 999 F.2d at 874 ("Venue rules preserve judicial fairness by preventing forum-shopping
and diminishing the chances of biased adjudication."); Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1134
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[A] proliferation of permissible forums is staunchly to be avoided[.]") (footnote
omitted); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp.
252, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (stating that, with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), "Congress was.., interested in
seeing to it that plaintiffs do not have virtually unlimited power to bring actions in any forum-to
'give plaintiffs free reign [sic] to haul defendants hither and yon at their caprice' ") (quoting
United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948)). Note that while Leroy
specifically dealt with the venue statute contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), other courts have
extended their Leroy analysis to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson-Cook Medical,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 533, 540 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
227. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 184; see also Schwartz v. Electronic Data Sys., Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 287
(6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (stating with regard to the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction, that "[tihe framers and the First Congress intended to provide a tribunal in which a
foreigner or citizen of another state might have the law administered free from the local prejudices
or passions which might prevail in a state court against them as 'outsiders' ") (citations omitted);
Welch Foods, Inc. v. Packer, No. 93-CV-081 1E(F), 1994 WL 665399, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,
1994); Honda Assocs. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
228. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 185. Specifically, Leroy notes that when multiple forums are
implicated the "plaintiff may choose between those ... districts ... in terms of the availability of
witnesses. [and] the accessibility of other relevant evidence[.]" Id. at 185 (emphasis added). See
also Arnold v. Smith Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (N.D. Iowa 1974) ("Venue has been
considered as the place where jurisdiction may be exercised, and while it affords some protection
to defendants, it is designed to facilitate the maximum convenience for all the litigants.") (citation
omitted).
229. Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, U. CHi. L. REv. 976, 980
(1982); see also Lamont, 590 F.2d at 1133. In addressing the purpose behind 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), the Lamont court stated:
The portion of Section 1391(b) extending venue to a district "in which the claim
arose" was added by amendment in 1966, and the resulting "enlargement of venue"
was intended merely to "facilitate the disposition of ... claims by providing, in
appropriate cases, a more convenient forum to the litigants and the witnesses
involved."
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
230. But see, e.g., Bates v. C&S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1992); Trowbridge
v. Empire of Am. Realty Credit Corp., No. 93-C-5507, 1995 WL 311425, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 18,
1995); Woodke v. Dahm, 873 F. Supp. 179, 197-98 (N.D. Iowa 1995), aff'd, 70 F.3d 983 (9th
Cir. 1995).
231. See, e.g., Henninger, supra note 20, at 832-34.
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pick and choose from the expanded list.232 Rather, convenience to all
remains the purpose of venue.233 Nevertheless, it is rare to find federal
232. See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 42, at 769-782; see also David D. Siegel, Commentary on
1988 and 1990 Revisions of Section 1391, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391, at 7-22 (West 1993). But see
Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp. v. Del Am. Properties, Inc., No. 93-CV-0692E(F), 1995 WL
128978, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1995) (rejecting defendant's contention that the 1990 and 1992
congressional amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 were designed to "prevent forum shopping and
the imposition upon defendants of the inconvenience of being sued in districts with little or no
connection to the underlying litigation" in light of defendant's failure to cite authority in support
of that proposition); Berube v. Brister, 140 F.R.D. 258, 260 (D.R.I. 1992) ("In most questionable
venue circumstances the new statute actually appears to have liberalized the venue
requirements.") (emphasis added).
233. Consider the following. As originally enacted in 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provided:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside,
except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
(d) An alien may be sued in any district.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 935. In 1966, subsections (a) and (b) of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 were amended to read:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizen-
ship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside,
or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.
Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 1111. Comparison of the original 1948
statute with the 1966 amendments, might suggest that the 1966 amendments were designed to
offer plaintiffs more venue choices. But this is not accurate. Although venue options were
expanded, the expansion was merely to "facilitate the disposition of both contract and tort claims
by providing, in appropriate cases, a more convenient forum to the litigants and the witnesses
involved." S. REP. No. 1752, 89th CONG., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3693
(emphasis added). Accord Leroy, 443 U.S. at 185.
The next amendment to § 1391 relevant to this Article came in 1988. The amendment reads:
(c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a State which has more than one
judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to
subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is
no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within
which it has the most significant contacts.
Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title X, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4669. While this section
clearly widens venue options when corporations are defendant parties to litigation, no evidence
indicates Congress sacrificed the convenience factor in favor of a plaintiff's exclusive right to
choose a venue. See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 42; Siegel, supra note 232.
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decisions discussing, let alone implementing, this purpose.2 3 4 Federal
courts typically peruse the possible choices detailed in the relevant stat-
utes and typically stop when the chosen forum fits into the list of choices
provided.235 There is little, if any, discussion on whether plaintiff has
The last major change to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 relevant to this article came in 1990. Subsections
(a) and (b) were amended to read:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizen-
ship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial
district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which the defendants are subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the
action may otherwise be brought.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only if (1) a judi-
cial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if
there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, title HI, § 3111, 104 Stat. 5114. Again, the legislative
history does not indicate that convenience was sacrificed in favor of the plaintiff's unlimited
choice. See School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Milk Mktg. Bd., 877 F. Supp. 245, 249 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
The court stated:
It is clear that the 1990 Amendments changed the venue rules as to (b)(2) so that
venue can now be laid in more than one district, so long as each has a substantial
relationship to the action. What did not change, however, was that the venue rules
are designed to be fair to the defendant, so that one is not "haled into a remote
district having no real relationship to the forum."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Moreover, all evidence suggests that the 1990 amend-
ments were merely intended to address the difficulties courts had in applying the "in which the
claim arose" language of the 1966 amendment. See also Oakley, supra note 42; Siegel, supra
note 232.
234. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 226-228, 230; Missouri Hous. Dev. Comm'n v. Brice,
919 F.2d 1306, 1309-12 (8th Cir. 1990). None of these decisions relies on the convenience of all
concerned as the deciding factor. Some even conclude that the convenience factor has diminished
in importance. See, e.g., Bates, 980 F.2d at 867; see also Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455,
1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994).
235. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) represents an excellent example of this.
See supra notes 20-41 and accompanying text. When the Pennsylvania residents filed the
Pennsylvania-based claim in a state having no connection with the plaintiffs or the lawsuit, why
didn't the chosen court-assuming it reviewed the complaint before receiving plaintiffs' transfer
motion-dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that it was inconvenient forum to try the litigation for
the court, the potential jurors, the parties, the witnesses, and all evidence relevant to the
underlying claim?
Dismissal would have precluded the Ferens plaintiffs from pursuing their claim because the
applicable statute of limitations in Pennsylvania had expired. But whether the claim can be
pursued is not-nor should it be-relevant to the inconvenient forum inquiry. See infra notes
236-92 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Ferens Court seems to have used plaintiff's
predicament to support plaintiffs' request to transfer! For example, the Court expressed the
following concern if the litigation were to stay in the inconvenient forum:
"Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
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filed in a jurisdiction convenient with regard to the residence of parties
and location of evidence, including witnesses. Current implementation
of venue statutes, then, condones a plaintiff's unfettered right to choose
among a host of different districts.236
Once judges are reminded of the purpose of venue and begin
approaching venue selection with convenience as the primary criterion,
the notion that it is proper to base a filing decision on where the pre-
ferred laws or juries are will disappear. Admittedly, this analysis runs
counter to the practice of many courts, which are rejecting underlying
legislative history in favor of the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage.237 Such a notion should disappear. No party should have the
right to hale parties, documents, and witnesses "hither and yon" 238 in
pursuit of the most favorable laws or juries. The purpose of venue laws
is to find a convenient place to try a given lawsuit.239 The only way to
enforce this purpose-without modifying every venue law-is to return
to the spirit of venue laws.
This task is easy to implement. No federal statute has to be
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to
the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for
holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country
where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness too, in having the trial of
a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the
case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflicts
of laws, and in law foreign to itself."
Id. at 529-30 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)).
236. Limitations based on personal jurisdiction still apply. But where corporations, in
particular, national corporations, are parties to the litigation, jurisdictional limitations become
meaningless. Recall that the reason the Ferens plaintiffs were able to secure jurisdiction in
Mississippi was because the corporate defendant had done business in that state, "as it had in
many other states .... " Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423, 424 (3d Cir. 1987). Even though
that defendant had qualified itself to do business in many states, that status should not necessarily
mean that that defendant can be sued in a state on a matter wholly unconnected with that state.
237. See, e.g., Free v. Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the plain
meaning of statutory language governed despite conclusive proof that the legislature intended the
opposite result); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990). But consider, for example, the venue-shopping cases decided under FED. RULE CiV. P. 41.
Even when it is clear that a party is attempting to forum-shop, the cases do not analyze that issue.
Rather, they focus on the purpose behind, and not just the language contained in, the rule.
Consider also cases dealing with the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. When parties
have attempted to forum-shop by dropping federal claims and/or by adding or dismissing parties
either to defeat jurisdiction or to secure a remand, courts have focused on the purposes behind the
removal statute. See, e.g., Frith v. Blazon-Flexible Flyer, Inc., 512 F.2d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 1975);
Kerrin v. Federated Dep't Stores, 100 F.R.D. 715, 717 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Myers v. Hertz Penske
Truck Leasing, 572 F. Supp. 500, 502 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
238. United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 537, 588 (1948).
239. See supra notes 223-29, 233 and accompanying text. Contra Sussman v. Bank of Israel,
56 F.3d 450, 457 (2d Cir. 1995); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1463-64 (9th Cir, 1994).
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amended. No Supreme Court action is necessary.2 4 ° In the federal sys-
tem, courts should return to the use of the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which allows a court to refuse to exercise juris-
diction over a case that "may be more appropriately and justly tried else-
where."' 24 1 Thus, a court may "resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute. 242 Under the doctrine, a court will consider the private interests
of the litigant-presumably the plaintiff-as well as public interest fac-
tors. The private interest factors include:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compul-
sory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if
view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if
one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obsta-
cles to fair trial.243
Public interest factors focus on the burden to the forum. Thus:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled
up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury
duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country
where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appro-
priateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of
laws, and in law foreign to itself.2 "
240. Recall that the Supreme Court has found no constitutional problem with a forum unrelated
to the litigation applying its own law. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
241. BLACK'S LAW DIcrxONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990); see also supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
242. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). In his dissent in Gulf Oil, Justice
Black stated that once personal jurisdiction exists and venue is proper, a court should not-
indeed, cannot---dismiss on the ground that another, more convenient forum exists. Specifically,
he stated, "Neither the venue statute nor the statute which has governed jurisdiction since 1789
contains any indication or implication that a federal district court, once satisfied that jurisdiction
and venue requirements have been met, may decline to exercise its jurisdiction." Id. at 513
(Black, J., dissenting). Clearly, however, federal venue statutes, as well as most state venue
statutes, are based on the convenience of all. See, e.g., supra notes 223-29, 233 and
accompanying text. Thus, even where personal jurisdiction is proper and the sought-after venue is
a permissible option under the venue statute, the court should not be obligated to hear the case.
Rather, the convenience issue must still be addressed.
243. Id. at 508.
244. Id. at 508-09.
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More vigorous use of the common law doctrine would clearly limit the
practice of picking and choosing among venues to secure favorable laws
or juries. Indeed, when a forum is unconnected with the litigation,
application of these factors would routinely lead to dismissal.
Although the forum non conveniens doctrine is the ideal mecha-
nism for restraining unjustifiable venue choices, one problem exists.
Since enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the Supreme Court has gener-
ally taken the view that § 1404 replaced and codified that common law
doctrine in the federal arena.2 45 Thus, forum non conveniens-in prac-
tice-is limited to the international setting. 46 But this conclusion is
wrong. The Supreme Court has interpreted transfer and forum non con-
veniens differently: Transfers result in no change in the law applicable
to the case; dismissals based on forum non conveniens result in applica-
tion of the law of the new forum. 47 Thus, because different results
obtain, § 1404(a) cannot be a codification of the common law doc-
trine2 48 and both transfer and forum non conveniens should be available.
In cases where the forum has contacts with the litigation, but other juris-
dictions also have contacts, transfer should remain an option. If, how-
ever, the forum has no connection with the lawsuit, the court should
consider only dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens z49
Alternatively, federal courts might give more serious consideration
to motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). z5 ° Section 1404(a)
allows the court to transfer a suit to another jurisdiction for the conven-
ience of all parties and in the interest of justice. In deciding the merits
of transfer, the court considers factors identical to those considered
under the forum non conveniens doctrine.2 5 ' Those factors-including
access to sources of proof, location of important witnesses, the need to
view the premises, congestion of the court's docket, imposition of jury
duty on a community with no connection to the litigation, and familiar-
245. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 986 n.2 (1994).
246. "(T]he federal doctrine offorum non conveniens has continuing application only in cases
where the alternative forum is abroad." Id.
247. See, e.g., Norwood, supra note 1, at 556-60; see also McAllen, supra note 47, at 202-08.
248. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 233, 253 (1981), where the Court states:
"Congress enacted § 1404(a) to permit changes of venue between federal courts. Although the
statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine offorum non conveniens, it was intended to be
a revision rather than a codification of the common law." (citation omitted).
249. Courts clearly have equitable powers to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
McAllen, supra note 47, at 231. But because such relief is extremely rare, it is not appropriate to
rely on a court's use of its equitable powers to dismiss a case. Id. at 232.
250. See supra note 26 for the text of § 1404(a).
251. See, e.g., Paradis v. Dooley, 774 F. Supp. 79, 82 (D.R.I. 1991) ("Although the Gilbert
Piper Aircraft analysis was formulated to address the issue of forum non conveniens, the same
factors apply when a court is deciding a motion to transfer [under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)]."); Levitt
v. State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund, 643 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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ity with the governing law 2 52-are crucial for identifying a convenient
place for trial.
Because of current interpretations of transfer statutes, however,
merely transferring more cases under § 1404(a) will probably not
resolve this Article's law-shopping concerns. The Supreme Court has
held that whenever a case is transferred under § 1404(a), the law of the
transferring court will follow the case to the new forum.2 53 So while
granting transfers obviously will result in a change of jury pool and thus
thwart jury-shopping, granting transfers would do nothing to prevent a
party from seeking to secure the transferring forum's procedural laws.254
Thus, it is necessary to rely primarily on the common law doctrine in
order to respond appropriately to law- and jury-shopping concerns.
But another problem exists. Specifically, because of an unex-
plained policy that a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to substantial
deference,255 it remains difficult to obtain either a dismissal or a trans-
fer.256 But substantial deference is not always justified. This notion of
deference to plaintiff's choice of forum developed in an era when plain-
tiffs usually filed suit in their home courts. It was presumed that the
252. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 985-86 (1994) (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)); see also Bradbury v. St. Mary's Hosp., 652
N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (111. App. Ct. 1995); Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 41 Cal. Rptr.
2d 342, 345-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). See generally authorities cited infra note 265.
253. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990); VanDusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 639 (1964).
254. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 215, at 49; Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 COLUM. L. Rev. 277 (1990). This is true even for lawsuits filed in a state having no connection
with the plaintiff or the litigation. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988).
This is not a problem, however, in the intrastate setting, i.e., where a case is transferred from one
venue to another within the same state. Neither is this a problem for any case, federal or state,
dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Norwood, supra note 1, at 556-60.
Moreover, while choice-of-law doctrines may resolve some law-shopping conduct when plaintiffs
attempt to secure the more favorable substantive laws of a forum with no connection with the
litigation, choice-of-law theories will have no effect on parties seeking the forum's procedural
laws, interpretations of laws, or juries.
255. See, e.g., McAllen, supra note 47, at 237-38 (arguing that like Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947), the later case of Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) "offers no
account as to why there should be deference at all to the plaintiff, much less any particular amount
of deference"). Numerous cases, however, support this unexplained policy of deference to
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 703 (9th
Cir. 1995); Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas, Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995);
Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir. 1994); TooGood v. Pangloss, Ltd.,
No. 93-1061, 1993 WL 52642 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 1993); Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981
F.2d 824, 836 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2963 (1993); Blanco v. Banco
Industrial, 997 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1993).
256. However, a plaintiff seeking transfer encounters no such difficulty. See, e.g., Ferens, 494
U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that as long as plaintiff is careful to file suit in "a really
inconvenient forum," he is assured of winning a motion to transfer).
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home forum was convenient for the plaintiff.257 Today, however, more
and more suits are filed in forums with no connection to the plaintiff,
much less with the litigation. Thus, the presumption that the plaintiff's
choice of forum is based on convenience-and so deserves great defer-
ence-should no longer arise automatically. Moreover, although many
federal courts say that a plaintiff's forum choice deserves less deference
when there is an "absence of any material connection or significant con-
tact between the forum state and the events allegedly underlying the
claim, '258 few courts act accordingly. If courts truly are giving plain-
tiffs' forum choices "less" deference, why do parties still file in states
unconnected with the litigation or in inconvenient states? 259 And why
do cases continue to be litigated in jurisdictions with little or no connec-
tion with the forum? This appears to be another example of courts say-
ing one thing but doing another in practice.26 ° Moreover, the giving of
less deference is not adequate. Why should a plaintiff's forum choice
deserve any weight when plaintiff is not a resident of the chosen venue
or when the litigation has little or nothing to do with the chosen venue?
The party seeking the requested venue should have to justify its choice
by demonstrating the venue's connection to the claim.
Similar options exist at the state court level. Although Section
1404(a) is not available, 26' and state courts cannot transfer to federal
courts or to state courts in other states, 262 most state courts can transfer
litigation to other courts within the same state.2 63 Such power is granted
257. See, e.g., Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524
(1947); cf. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 41 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting).
258. Levitt v. State of Md. Dep. Ins. Fund Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
See also Creative Technology, 61 F.3d at 704; Ticketmaster-N. Y., 26 F.3d at 211; Baumgart, 981
F.2d at 836 n.12; Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corp., No. 94-CIV-4770, 1995 WL 479474, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1995); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., No. CIV-A-92-
7459, 1995 WL 472099, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1995); Americas Ins. Co. v. Engicon, Inc., 894 F.
Supp. 1068, 1075 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Bhd v. Steinberg, No. 95-C-1574, 1995 WL 348136, at *1
(N.D. I11. June 7, 1995). Other authorities support the proposition that any deference to a
plaintiff's choice of a particular forum is inappropriate where plaintiff has already freely
contractually chosen a different forum. See, e.g., Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880
(3d Cir. 1995).
259. Even if the judicial system were to adopt this Article's suggestion to return to the purpose
behind venue laws when resolving venue issues, Ferens would still allow a plaintiff to file suit in
an inconvenient forum for the purpose of obtaining that forum's more favorable procedural laws.
Such a plaintiff would be assured of a transfer and of "winning" the benefits of obtaining the
sought-after law. This is a key reason why Ferens should be overruled. See Norwood, supra note
1, at 543-67. Moreover, if courts were to start routinely sanctioning attorneys who filed in forums
unconnected in at least some way to the litigation, attorneys might actually think twice before
engaging in such conduct.
260. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 8; see also supra note 26 for the text of § 1404(a).
262. See supra note 8.
263. See, for example, FLA. STAT. ch. 47.122 (1993) and ALA. CODE § 6-3-21.1(a) (1993),
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by state statutes, court rules or both.2" Additionally, virtually every
state recognizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens.265 Thus, regard-
both of which parallel the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Gauntt v. United Ins. Co.,
No. 1940591, 1996 WL 55604, at *18 (Ala. Feb. 9, 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting); Makar v.
Makar, No. FA95-032-16-80-S, 1995 WL 276117, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 1995);
McCrory v. Abraham, 657 A.2d 499, 501 n.2, 504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); State ex reL. Smith v.
Maynard, 454 S.E.2d 46, 49 n.4, 50-51 (Ct. App. W. Va. 1994).
264. See cases cited supra note 263.
265. See, e.g., Swift Loan & Fin. Co. v. Shepard, No. 1940384, 1995 WL 473493, at *1-2
(Ala. Aug. 11, 1995); Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 907-08 (Alaska 1985); Coonley
& Coonley v. Turck, 844 P.2d 1177, 1180-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Life of Am. Ins. Co. v.
Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 873 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Ark. 1994); Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance
Co. of N.A., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 345-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); People ex rel. A.T.W.S., 899 P.2d
223, 225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Gager v. Gager, No. 0126054, 1995 WL 534237, at * 1-3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1995); Macklowe v. Planet Hollywood, Inc., No. Civ. A 13689, 1994 WL
586835, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 4, 1994); Jimmerson v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 663 A.2d
540, 542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. 84329, 1996 WL
26554, at *8 (Fla. Jan. 26, 1996) (recognizing the doctrine, but stating that the right of access to
Florida courts "has never been understood as a limitless warrant to bring the world's litigation
here"); Allen v. Allen, 645 P.2d 300, 307 (Haw. 1982); Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 716
P.2d 513, 518 n.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); Bradbury v. St. Mary's Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1228, 1230-
31 (111. Ct. App. 1995); RJR Nabisco Holdings Corps. v. Dunn, 642 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994) (stating that although the doctrine of forum non conveniens is limited to the interstate
setting, identical considerations apply in the intrastate setting); In re Marriage of Kimura, 471
N.W.2d 869, 878-79 (Iowa 1991); Environmental Ventures, Inc. v. Alda Servs. Corp., 868 P.2d
540, 546-47 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Skidmore v. Meade, 676 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Ky. 1984); Wallace
v. Wallace, 631 So. 2d 40, 41-42 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Coming v. Coming, 563 A.2d 379, 380-81
(Me. 1989); Cronin v. Camilleri, 648 A.2d 694, 698-99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Catalogna v.
Copley Pharm., Inc., No. Civ. A 94-6662, 1995 WL 510145, at *4-5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 11,
1995); Russell v. Chrysler Corp., 505 N.W.2d 263, 264-66 (Mich. 1993); First State Ins. Co. v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 535 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Hunt v. Hunt, 629
So. 2d 548, 553-54 (Miss. 1992); Connour v. Burlington N. R.R., 889 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994); Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Kight, 522 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Neb. 1994);
Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 762 P.2d 886, 888 (Nev. 1988); Stankunas v. Stankunas,
582 A.2d 280, 281-82 (N.H. 1990); Buccilli v. Timby, Brown & Timby, 660 A.2d 1261, 1266
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Marchman v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 898 P.2d 709, 718-24
(N.M. 1995); Sambee Corp. v. Moustafa, 628 N.Y.S.2d 664, 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Motor
Inn Mgmt., Inc. v. Irvin-Fuller Dev. Co., 266 S.E.2d 368, 370-72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); North
Valley Water Ass'n v. Northern Improvement Co., 415 N.W.2d 492, 496 (N.D. 1987); R.E.
Condit Co. v. United Tractor Co., No. 14945, 1995 WL 547072, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1995); Stevens v. Blevins, 890 P.2d 936, 938-40 (Okla. 1995); C.O.W., Inc. v. Motor Vehicles,
586 P.2d 107, 108 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1978); Keuther v. Snyder, 664 A.2d 168, 169 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995); Federal Land Bank v. Davant, 355 S.E.2d 293, 297 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); People ex reL. J.J.
and S.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 329-30 (S.D. 1990); Smith v. Priority Trans., Inc., No. 02A01-9203-
CV-00074, 1993 WL 29021, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1993); A.P. Keller Dev., Inc v. One
Jackson Place, Ltd., 890 S.W.2d 502, 505-08 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625,
628 (Utah 1977); Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 356 A.2d 506, 509-10 (Vt. 1976); Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co. v. Williams, 389 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Va. 1990); J.E. Lynch v. Pack, 846 P.2d 542,
543 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Cannelton Indus., Inc v, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of America, 460
S.E.2d 1, 5-17 (W. Va. 1994); Hoffman v. Memorial Hosp., 538 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995); West Tex. Utils. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991). The author
found no state court opinions for Rhode Island. "Montana has yet to apply the common law
doctrine offorum non conveniens in any non-FELA case." State of Montana ex rel. Burlington N.
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498 (Mont. 1995). Finally, the status of the doctrine
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less of whether a state court has the power to transfer a case to another
court in the same state, the court may use the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.266 State courts, then, through their power to transfer or dis-
miss cases using state statutes, court rules, or common law, may also
start viewing all venue filing decisions with one primary inquiry in
mind: Is the host forum a convenient forum for trial?2 67
State courts also give great deference to plaintiff's forum choice,268
and like some federal courts, several states will not even consider a
transfer or a dismissal unless the defendant shows that an alternative
forum will hear the case.269 Some states also do not allow cases filed in
proper venues to be transferred merely because another, more conve-
nient venue exists.270 Furthermore, some states require that the movant
is unclear in Georgia. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Regents, 302 S.E.2d 124, 125 (Ga. Ct. App.
1983) (stating that the doctrine of forum non conveniens "has never been expressly sanctioned in
Georgia courts").
266. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Henderson, 794 P.2d 754, 754 (Okla. 1990) (holding that courts
may use common law doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens despite legislative enactments
on venue changes). The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been codified in some states. See,
e.g., Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 187 (Smith-Hurd 1993). In the federal system, few cases apply forum non
conveniens for either interstate or intrastate transfers; rather, § 1404, drafted in accordance with
that doctrine, is primarily used. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) historical notes (Supp. V. 1993);
H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th CoNG., 1st Sess. A132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th CONG., 2d Sess.
A127 (1946); see also American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 986 n.2 (1994) (stating
that "the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application only is cases where
the alternative forum is abroad").
267. See supra note 223; see also Kristine Roszak, Note, Forum Non Conveniens-Illinois
Judges Granted Authority to Curb Intrastate Forum Shopping. Torres v. Walsh, 98 lll.2d 338,
456 N.E.2d 601 (1983), 1983 So. ILL. U. L. REv. 395.
268. See. e.g., Marchman, 898 P.2d at 720 (N.M. 1995); Tipton v. Estate of Cusick, 651
N.E.2d 635, 636 (I11. App. Ct. 1995); Scla v. AC & S, Inc., 657 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa. 1995). Like
federal courts, state courts also give "less deference" to "foreign" plaintiffs. See, e.g., Bradbury,
652 N.E.2d at 1231; Ford Motor Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
269. See, e.g., Coonley, 844 P.2d at 1181. For a federal court that maintains this view, see
Mizokami Bros. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 660 F.2d 712, 719 (8th Cir. 1981). Compare Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 233 (1981), where the Court stated:
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should
never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course, if
the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be
given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be
in the interests of justice.
Id. at 254. Notice that where the applicable statute of limitations has expired in the more conve-
nient forum, this requirement might sound the death knell for the sought-after transfer or dismis-
sal. To avoid this issue, some courts have conditioned transfer or dismissal on the defendant's
promise to waive the statute of limitations defense in the new forum. See, e.g., Mizokami Bros.,
660 F.2d at 719; Revelle v. Davis, 653 N.E.2d 443,445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Marchman, 898 P.2d
at 724; 731. See generally JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 8, § 2.31, at 105; see also Jeffrey J.
Kanne, Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: History, Application, and Acceptance in
Iowa, 69 IOWA L. REv. 975, 988-89 (1984).
270. In some states, a case cannot be transferred to another venue unless venue in the
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show oppression before transfer or dismissal can be obtained.27'
Finally, some states do not allow trial judges to transfer a case sua
sponte but rather require them to wait until a party requests such
relief.272
But once the focus on venue returns to convenience, these question-
able conclusions should disappear. As suggested earlier, the notion that
a plaintiff's choice of forum deserves any deference is not a proper start-
ing point when neither the plaintiff nor the litigation has any connection
with the chosen venue.273 In such cases, no deference should be given
to the choice.274 Moreover, once convenience becomes the appropriate
transferor court is improper. See, e.g, In re Marriage of Engler, 532 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Iowa
1995). But this does not mean that the court is prohibited from using the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to dismiss the case.
271. See, e.g, Scola, 657 A.2d at 1241 (stating that a plaintiff should not be deprived of her
choice of forum unless defendant establishes" 'such oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant
as to be out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience.' ") (citation omitted). The "oppression"
factor derives from the Supreme Court. In Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,
330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947), the Court states:
Where there are only two parties to a dispute, there is good reason why it
should be tried in the plaintiff's home forum if that has been his choice. He should
not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home jurisdiction except upon a
clear showing of facts which either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation
to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience, which may
be shown to be slight or nonexistent, or (2) make trial in the chosen forum
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and
legal problems. In any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of convenience
by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the
inconvenience the defendant may have shown.
Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
272. See. e.g., Steven v. Blevins, 890 P.2d 936, 939-40 (Okla. 1995). The court, citing
authority from Pennsylvania, Nebraska, New York, and Texas, stated that where the chosen forum
is a proper venue, the trial judge has no authority to transfer the case sua sponte to another proper
forum. Id.
273. See supra notes 255-61 and accompanying test. This notion probably derives from the
concept of plaintiff as master of his complaint, see generally Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering
the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 273 (1993); Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., Comment,
Artful Pleading and Removal Jurisdiction: Ferreting Out the True Nature of a Claim, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 315 (1987), and thus, as master of his forum. See supra note 179 and accompanying text;
see also Comeaux, supra note 91, at 173 ("A long-standing tradition in American courts has been
that 'the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.' Because of this tradition, many courts follow the
notion that plaintiffs should have the right to file in whichever forum they deem most appropriate,
and the lawsuit should be tried in that forum.") (footnote omitted).
274. When a plaintiff is not a resident of the United States, courts are much more willing to
apply a "less deference" standard. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 236, 255-56 ("When the
home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the
plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable."). Even where the plaintiff
is a resident of the United States but not a resident of the chosen venue, many opinions purport to
apply a "less deference" standard. See, e.g., supra notes 258, 268. But, in fact, courts are not
applying that standard. Nothing else explains the litigation of cases in forums with little or no
connection to either the plaintiff or the subject matter of the lawsuit. Great deference is still being
given to plaintiff's forum choice.
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inquiry, transferring a case from one proper venue to another proper
venue should no longer be considered improper.27  As long as the pro-
posed venue is more convenient than the hosting venue, transfers or dis-
missals under the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not only be
encouraged but also made as fast and as early in the litigation as possi-
ble. Similarly, a court should not have to wait to act until a party
requests transfer or dismissal.276 Nor should a showing of oppression be
required.277 If the inquiry is whether a forum more convenient to all
exists, the requesting party should not have to prove the oppressive
results of maintaining the litigation in the current forum. As the
Supreme Court has stated, oppression is relevant only when the defend-
ant seeks to deprive the plaintiff of plaintiff's home forum.278 This is
clearly not the case when neither the plaintiff nor the litigation has any
connection to the chosen forum.
In practice, this revised approach to venue will allow communities
affected by the conduct underlying the litigation to resolve that litiga-
tion. In Kemner v. Monsanto Co.,279 for example, where the accident
occurred in Sturgeon, Missouri, and the plaintiffs and a clear majority of
the witnesses were located in that community, the action should not have
been filed and litigated in St. Clair County, Illinois.2 10 Rather, the courts
and potential jurors of Sturgeon, Missouri, should have been asked to
resolve that lawsuit. Similarly, in Futrell v. Luhr Bros. ,281 neither the St.
Louis courts nor community had any connection with the facts underly-
ing the plaintiff's claims. Because the plaintiff and the clear majority of
witnesses resided in Cape Girardeau, Missouri,282 venue should have
been in that community. At a minimum, St. Louis should have been
275. See, e.g., supra note 270 and accompanying text. Courts can use the doctrine of forum
non conveniens to dismiss the matter. Transfer has more advantages to the plaintiff than
dismissal. See, e.g., Norwood, supra note 1, at 556. But if the statute at issue does not provide for
transfers between proper venues, then only dismissal remains. Maybe this approach would
encourage legislatures to take immediate action. It might also force filing parties to think twice
before filing in a jurisdiction unrelated to the lawsuit.
276. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
278. In Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), the
Supreme Court found that plaintiff's choice of his home forum should not be disturbed unless,
among other things, defendant establishes "such oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to
be out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience." Id. at 524. See also supra note 271 for the
full text of this quotation. The Court undoubtedly used the word "home" for a particular reason.
It would have been easy to say just "forum." The oppression element was not discussed in the
context of plaintiff's choice generally, but rather was limited to plaintiff's "home."
279. 576 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
280. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
281. No. 91-9978 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis, Mo., filed Dec. 1991).
282. See supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
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ruled out as a proper venue.283
Not all cases will be so easy to resolve. For example, how does one
determine the convenient forum when the litigation is multijurisdic-
tional? Easy resolution, however, is not the goal. Courts resolve similar
issues every day.284 This inquiry would be neither impossible nor overly
burdensome.285
Finally, a true focus on convenience would eliminate the require-
ment that the party requesting transfer or dismissal demonstrate that the
newly proposed venue will actually hear the litigation.28 6  In some
cases-particularly when the filing party seeks to secure a longer statute
of limitations-a return to convenience may bar a party from pursuing
its claims. In Ferens v. John Deere Co.,287 for example, if the district
court in Mississippi had dismissed the Ferenses' lawsuit on the ground
that Pennsylvania was a more convenient forum, the Ferenses' claim
would have been barred if filed in Pennsylvania by that state's statute of
limitations.28 8 But this is not the problem of the inconvenient forum. Is
it fair to the court in the inconvenient forum to be required to entertain
litigation it has little or no connection with merely because the real party
in interest delayed bringing the claim, or because the party's attorney
felt that the inconvenient forum would be more receptive to the client's
position, goals, and/or desires? Why should the burdens of jury duty "be
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the
litigation?"2 89 Isn't there any "local interest in having localized contro-
versies decided at home"?2 90 Isn't there "an appropriateness too, in hay-
283. Because the accident occurred in Louisiana, a Louisiana venue also would have been
proper. See. e.g., Giannouleas v. Phoenix Maritime Agencies, Inc., 621 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (La.
Ct. App. 1993).
284. See, e.g., supra note 222.
285. See, e.g., Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1994) (resolving a
venue issue where plaintiffs admitted moving from Nebraska to Minnesota, in part, to secure more
favorable Minnesota laws).
286. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
287. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
288. See supra notes 20-41 and accompanying text. See generally authorities cited supra note
20.
289. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 529-30 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09
(1947)).
290. Id. at 530; see Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. 84329, 1996 WL 26554 (Fla.
Jan. 25,1996). In Kinney, the plaintiff-insurance company was a New Hampshire corporation with
its principal place of business in New Jersey and doing business in Florida. The defendant was a
Delaware corporation, headquartered in New York, and doing business in Florida. The lawsuit
centered on the plaintiff's potential liability to the defendant under a worker's compensation
insurance policy, negotiated in New York City. In upholding the dismissal of the lawsuit under
forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court of Florida observed:
While Florida courts sometimes may properly concern themselves with a suit
essentially arising out-of-state, they nevertheless must take into account the impact
of such practices will have if not properly policed-an impact with substantial
19961
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ing the trial... in a forum that is at home with the state law that must
govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflicts of laws, and in law foreign to itself"? 291  Why
should courts and jurors in the inconvenient venue have to rise to the
filing parties' occasion?292
These suggestions can be enforced through Rule 11 of the Federal
effect on the taxpayers of this state and on the appropriation of public monies at
both the state and local level to pay for the costs of judicial operations.
We must rightly question expenditures of this type where the underlying
lawsuit has no genuine connection to the state. Florida's judicial interests are at
their zenith, and the expenditure of tax-funded judicial resources most clearly
justified, when the issues involve matters with a strong nexus to Florida's interests.
But that interest and justification wane to the degree such a nexus is lacking.
Id. at *4. The court continued:
(Thus, t]he use of Florida courts to police activites even in the remotest parts of the
globe is not a purpose for which our judiciary was created. Florida courts exist to
judge matters with significant impact upon Florida's interests, especially in light of
the fact that the taxpayers of this state pay for the operation of its judiciary. Noth-
ing in our Constitution compels the taxpayers to spend their money even for the
rankest forum shopping by out-of-state interests.
Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Several state courts require the party requesting transfer or dismissal to waive any
defenses available in the proposed forum that might accrue to it if the inconvenient forum grants
the request. See, e.g., supra note 269. This requirement is unnecessary. If the reason that the
inconvenient forum was chosen was to avoid the laws and/or courts of the convenient forum, it
would be senseless to condition transfer or dismissal on defendant's waiver of any defenses
available to it in the convenient forum.
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Rules of Civil Procedure,293 Rule 1l's state counterparts294 and the
293. Rule 11, amended by Congress in 1993, provides in relevant part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney ... is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the
violation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (a), (b) & (c). Under the 1993 amendment, the alleged Rule I 1 offender is given
21 days to respond or correct the challenged conduct. Specifically, Rule 1 l(c)(1)(A) provides:
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made sepa-
rately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged
to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be
filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion
(or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately cor-
rected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the
motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsi-
ble for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(1)(A). This "safe harbor" provision, as it is referred to in Rule I I's Notes of
Advisory Committee on Rules, has caused concern among some. See. e.g., Carl Tobias, The 1993
Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 207 (1994):
Some attorneys, however, may be tempted to employ the safe harbor device for
inappropriate tactical benefits. For instance, counsel could base notice of potential
violations on the refined parsing of a paper or questionable challenging of a factual
contention which might ultimately have evidentiary support. Service of notice
would require that targets unnecessarily expend substantial resources in order to
respond within three weeks. Upon receipt, targets are given only twenty-one days
to conduct a great deal of activity, such as analyzing the notification afforded,
reconsidering the allegedly offensive behavior or papers, and undertaking greater
research.
See also Christopher D. Wolek, Comment, Practice and Procedure: The "Safe-Harbor" Amend-
ment to Rule 11 ... Any Port in a Storm?, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 319, 332 (1994) (arguing that the
"safe harbor" provision "subverts Rule I I's entire purpose by effectively placing the duty to dis-
cover the inadequacies of a filing upon the other party or upon the court"). In March, 1995, the
U.S. House of Representatives also passed the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995. H.R. REP.
No. 62, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995). Among other things, the Act "would eliminate the safe
harbor provision of Rule 11." Jeffrey A. Parness, Safe Harbor Provision Should Be Preserved,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 24, 1995, at A21. The Act is awaiting debate in the Senate. Id.
294. Most state statutes and/or procedural rules parallel Rule 11. Byron C. Keeling, Toward a
Balanced Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State
Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. Rev. 1067 (1994).
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forum's own ethics rules in appropriate cases.
Rule 11, originally adopted in 1937,291 is " 'aimed at curbing
abuses of the judicial system.' "296 In law-shopping cases, Rule 11 sanc-
tions have rarely been imposed against the attorney or party.2 97 Courts
295. In its original form, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. (1960) provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not
be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat
the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action
may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
296. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542
(1991) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990)); see also Edward D.
Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 14 HoFsTRA L. REv. 499,499-500 (1986); Keeling, supra note 294, at 1075; Karen K.
Cain, Comment, Frivolous Litigation, Discretionary Sanctioning and a Safe Harbor: The 1993
Revision of Rule 11, 43 KAN. L. Rav. 207, 207 (1994).
297. For cases involving the filing of multiple identical lawsuits, see Bolivar v. Pocklington,
975 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1992); Hapaniewski v. City of Chicago Heights, 833 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enters., 886 F.2d 1485, 1492-
93 (7th Cir. 1989).
In Kapco, the court also imposed sanctions on the attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section
1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
For cases involving attorneys who knowingly filed in improper venues, see Barton v. Williams, 38
Fed. Rules Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 966, 967-68 (N.D. Ohio 1983); cf Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F.
Supp. 1577 (E.D. Mo. 1984). In Hasty, plaintiff filed suit in Missouri against a defendant with no
connection to the state. After dismissing plaintiff's claim, the court states:
[In view of plaintiff's utter failure to come forward with evidence of even the
slightest connection between [the defendant] and the State of Missouri, so as to
satisfy the long-arm statute and the requirements of the due process clause, [the
defendant] may wish to file a motion to impose sanctions against plaintiff's counsel,
... in the amount of [the defendant's] costs and attorney's fees in defending this
action to date.
It appears that [plaintiff's counsel] violated [Rule 11] as to [the defendant] by fail-
ing to make a reasonable inquiry as to the nature, quality or quantity of [the defend-
ant's] contacts with Missouri or compliance with the long-arm statute. It matters
not that this action was first filed in state court. The joinder of [the defendant] was
not based upon a good faith inquiry into either the facts or the law supporting the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over [the defendant] by Missouri courts. As a
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have imposed sanctions upon finding that an attorney's court document
was filed for an improper purpose 298 or otherwise evidenced an
attempted fraud or deceit upon the court.299 However, courts have not
imposed Rule 11 sanctions for filing suit in a given forum in order to
gain access to more favorable juries or laws. Indeed, some courts have
found that Rule 11 sanctions cannot attach for mere law-shopping as
long as the chosen venue is proper.300 But maybe this conclusion is
wrong. Maybe Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed when an attorney
result, [the defendant] has been put to considerable and unnecessary expense and
trouble in obtaining the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against it.
Id. at 1580. As a general rule, however, courts remain reluctant to impose Rule 11 sanctions for
fear of chilling vigorous advocacy. See, e.g., Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 625-28 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that despite questionable basis for attorney's motion to recuse judge and other
conduct, Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted); Lamborn v. Dittner, 726 F. Supp. 510, 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that "the purpose of Rule 11 is not to dampen robust advocacy").
298. Rule 11 does not define the term "improper purpose." It does indicate, however, that
improper purpose would include such things as attempts to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(l). Because the list is not
exclusive, however, "attorneys and judges need more guidance as to what constitutes 'any
improper purpose.' " Sonya Scates & Richard L. Coffman, Note, The Abuse of Rule 11 and
Forum Non Conveniens: Fast, Effective Relief for Federal Docket Congestion?, 7 REV. LITIG.
311, 332 (1988).
299. Rule 11 sanctions are not limited to conduct expressly prohibited by court rule or statute.
For example, in Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D.
96 (D.N.J. 1985), the plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, brought a breach of contract suit against
the defendant, thought to be a Puerto Rico corporation with offices in New Jersey, based on
federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 97. Two years later, and well after the filing of its answer, the
filing of several motions on other issues, and the filing of carefully worded discovery answers,
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 99. As then revealed, no
diversity existed because the defendant was incorporated in Delaware. Id. Even though Rule
12(b)(1) allows a party to raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time, including for the first time
on appeal, Rule I sanctions were imposed (and rightly so) against the defendant.
Moreover, in response to counsel's suggestion that not raising the jurisdictional issue was in
the client's best interest, the court said:
The adversary system commands vigorous and zealous representation of one's
client. The "battle" should be fought hard-but fought fairly. Vigorous advocacy is
not inconsistent with decent behavior toward one's adversary and respect for the
court and does not mean the advocate may dishonor the judicial system and demean
the court simply because it will advance his client's cause.
... Thus, defense counsel here cannot validly claim that what they and their
client did is excused on the basis of the "duty to client" contention.
Id. at 101, 104.
300. See, e.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1994) (district court imposed Rule
11 sanctions in the amount of $10,000 against plaintiff's counsel for filing in a state with virtually
no connection to the lawsuit). In reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated:
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning
[plaintiff's] attorney ... for an 'unnecessary and frivolous' choice of venue.
... Attorneys are not under an affirmative obligation to file an action in the
most convenient forum; their only obligation is to file in a proper forum.
We hold that filing in an inconvenient but proper forum is not a legitimate
ground for Rule 11 sanctions.
Id. at 1463-64 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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files suit in a forum having no connection with either the parties, wit-
ness, or the subject matter of the litigation. Maybe filing a lawsuit in a
forum with no connection to either the plaintiff or the litigation should
be considered an "improper purpose" within the meaning of the Rule.
Individual state's ethics rules might also be used to enforce the new
approach to venue selection suggested here. Some states follow the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1969;301 other states follow their own "revised" ver-
sions of the Model Code. Similarly, some states follow the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 30 2 adopted by the ABA in 1983; other states
follow their own individually tailored versions of the Model Rules.
Additionally, some states adopt various combinations of the Model
Code and Model Rules. 3  Finally, most state courts and all federal
courts have their own local rules °.3 ' The local rules applicable in a
given court may further define (or confuse) the ethical parameters of
attorney conduct.30 5 These distinctions may be of no relevance to the
practitioner with an extremely localized practice. But for any attorney
who practices or litigates in multiple states, 30 6 these differences are cru-
cial.30 7 Indeed, these differences alone might spur a party to shop for the
301. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS
423 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr. eds. 1996).
302. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT, reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS 3
(Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr. eds. 1996).
303. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REv. 335, 339 (1994).
304. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 601-03 (7th Cir. 1991) (observing that 18.18%
of federal courts have no identifiable set of ethics rules; 31.82% have adopted some version of the
Model Rules; 26.14% have adopted some version of the Model Code; and 9.09% have adopted
some combination of the Model Code and Model Rules).
305. See id. at 600-03; Eli Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney Ethics, 29
GA. L. REv. 137, 153-55.
306. See, e.g., Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of Rules of
Professional Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the States, 45 Bus. LAW.
1229, 1229 n.1 (May 1990) ("The fact that ever-increasing numbers of lawyers are admitted in
two or more jurisdictions or are in partnerships with lawyers admitted in different states has been
well documented.").
307. For example, an attorney licensed in New York must comply with that state's ethics rules.
But this attorney might also litigate a case in a state where she is not licensed. See Committee on
Counsel Responsibility, supra note 306, at 1229-30 n.l. While litigating in the latter state, the
attorney must comply with that state's ethics rules. Id. This is simple. Now add the fact that
there are no federal ethics rules. See supra note 304. Suppose, for example, that an attorney is
litigating a matter in federal court. Whether or not the attorney is licensed in the state where the
federal court sits is of no moment. The federal court will borrow the ethics laws of some state.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts
and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FoR, DHAM URB. L.J. 969, 970-73 (1992); Richardson, supra note
305, at 142 n.14; United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 420-22 (D. Md. 1994). Which state
the federal court will choose is rarely clear. See generally Kathleen Clark, Is Discipline
Different? An Essay on Choice of Law and Lawyer Conduct, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 1069 (1995).
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most favorable ethics rules! 30 8  Because of the virtually unintelligible
variance in ethics rules based upon the state hosting a given litigation,
the author speaks more generally here.
Several rules contained in the Model Code and Model Rules require
an attorney to act in the client's best interest. Model Rule 1.3 states "A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in represent-
ing a client. '30 9 Canon 7 of the Model Code states, "A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."'310 Attorneys
frequently rely on these rules to justify law-shopping and jury-shopping
conduct. 31I But an attorney certainly is not free to do anything he or she
chooses-even though within the bounds of the law-under the guise of
the clients' best interest.3 2 Moreover, other rules operate to curb any
such temptations. For example, Canon 1 states, "A lawyer should assist
in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession;" 31 3
Canon 9 states, "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of profes-
sional impropriety; '314 and Model Rule 8.4 prohibits a lawyer from,
among other things, engaging in conduct that is dishonest, fraudulent,
deceitful, or prejudicial to the administration of justice.3 5 These rules
308. The defendant in Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, contended that the plaintiff Justice
Department filed suit in Maryland, instead of in the state where the events giving rise to the
litigation occurred, in order to secure more favorable interpretations of the ethics rules governing
the government's conduct in the underlying litigation. Id. at 420-21.
309. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1995).
310. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
311. Recall also the attorney's concern with potential malpractice liability for failure to forum-
shop. See supra note 202; infra note 316.
312. See supra note 298 and accompanying text; see also Fitzhugh v. Committee on
Professional Conduct, 823 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Ark. 1992). The Fitzhugh court stated:
We are not insensitive to the demands made on or perceived by lawyers to protect
the interests of their clients. Nevertheless, if the legal profession is to retain the
unique privilege of self-regulation, our ethical standards must not be compromised
under the guise of protecting the interests of clients.
Moreover, other ethics rules restrain the general duty to act in the client's best interest. For
example, Model Rule 3.1 states in part "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding ...
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous ...." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1995). Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2) under the Model Code is similar. It
states, "[A] lawyer shall not: (2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law ...." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1983).
Several courts have interpreted these rules to encompass the filing of multiple identical complaints
or petitions. See, e.g., Petition to Impose Discipline on Consent at 6, In re Gill and Marks,
Comm'n Nos. 94-CH-837 & 838 (Ill. filed Dec. 16, 1994) (on file with author). Thus, while it
may be in the client's best interest to secure a particular judge to try a matter, it would be a
violation of Model Rule 3.1 to file multiple identical petitions in an effort to secure the judge of
choice.
313. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1983).
314. Id. Canon 9 (1983).
315. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1995). For an example of a forum-
shopping case dealing with Model Rule 8.4 that does not involve the filing of multiple identical
pleadings or the pursuit of frivolous claims or contentions, see Sollenbarger v. Mountain States
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help ensure that a lawyer does not focus solely on the client's best inter-
est.3 16 They also may be used to curb jury- and law-shopping.
Neither the Model Code nor Model Rules contain provisions that
either expressly prohibit or condone forum-shopping in any form. And
although some courts have found particular instances of judge-shopping
to be unethical, no courts appear to have specifically addressed the eth-
ics of jury- or law-shopping. 317 The author cannot explain this. Nor can
Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776 (D.N.M. 1989). A defendant who knew at the outset of the
litigation that the judge trying the case had financial interests in nonparty operating companies
owned by the defense waited eight months after the lawsuit had been filed and until after several
adverse rulings to file a motion to recuse the judge based on the judge's financial interest. Id. at
784-85. Although recusal was granted, the manipulative nature of the defendant's conduct, led
the court to let stand all prior rulings of the recused judge. Id. at 785. Insofar as potential ethics
violations were concerned, the court, first recognizing the defense maneuver as judge-shopping,
id. at 784, refused to allow the defendant to just "walk away from the table after it has sampled the
judicial fare and found the taste unpleasant." Id. The court then stated:
The inescapable conclusion is that [the defense] chose to wait and see how this court
would rule before playing its trump card. This conduct is blameworthy and dilatory
and seemingly may implicate Model Code of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d)
(prohibition to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice") or Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5) (same).
Id. at 785. The potential ethics violations in Sollenbarger were not discussed further in the opin-
ion. Nor has the author located any subsequent opinions dealing more specifically with the ethical
ramifications of the defense conduct in Sollenbarger.
316. Consider also the attorney who is not as concerned with the client's best interest as she is
with her own sense of ethics and morals. For example, what if an attorney refuses to shop for
juries or laws? Might this attorney be subject to ethical discipline for failure to proceed in the
client's best interest? See, for example, Model Rule 1.3 and Model Code Canon 7. Might she
subject herself to malpractice liability? See supra note 202. The author has found four cases
dealing with legal malpractice actions based on an attorney's failure to forum-shop. See, e.g.,
Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930-31 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Mims v. Wardlaw, 338 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Holland v. State, 444 N.E.2d 1190, 1192
(Ind. 1983); Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). The courts decided
in the attorneys' favor in all four cases. In Stricklan, the court held that no cause of action lies
against an attorney for "the manner in which he honestly chooses to present his client's case," id.
at 814, including the attorney's decision not to move for a change of venue. See generally Ronald
E. Mallen, Legal Malpractice: The Legacy of the 1970s, 16 FORUM 119, 127-29 (1980). For
identical reasons, the Woodruff court again rejected plaintiffs' attempt to sue an attorney in
malpractice for failure to seek a change of venue. 616 F.2d at 931. Moreover, the district court in
Woodruff noted the difficulty in having a malpractice jury attempt to decide what would have
happened if counsel had requested and secured a change of venue. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423
F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979), on
reh'g, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980). Similarly, in Holland, a
criminal defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected in light of evidence
"that the failure to move for a change of judge was a tactical decision in which petitioner
participated." 444 N.E.2d at 1192. In Mims, the defendant-attorney, who swore she had
represented the plaintiff "with the requisite degree of skill and care," won summary judgment
because of "the failure of plaintiff to counter the defendant's evidence with expert legal testimony
establishing the parameters of the acceptable professional representation[.]" 338 S.E.2d at 866.
However, even though all four cases were 'decided in the attorney's favor, these cases should
convince practitioners of the very real prospect of being a defendant in a malpractice case.
317. The author searched extensively for any such cases. After discovering only several cases
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the author explain why there is a greater reluctance among judges to
impose sanctions under ethics rules than under Rule 11.318 But clearly
the ethics rules mentioned here can and should be considered by the
courts as possible enforcement options.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our judicial system currently believes-at least in practice-that
as long as the methods are lawful, vigorous pursuit of favorable laws
and juries are appropriate goals. Under current enforcement of venue
statutes, then, most courts conclude that as long as the venue is an avail-
able choice under the applicable venue statute, the inquiry is at an end.
But this is a misuse of venue laws. And the misuse negatively impacts
upon public perceptions of justice and fairness and upon public confi-
dence in the judicial system.
An appropriate means of redress can be found by reevaluating
venue choices with the purpose of venue in mind. That purpose-con-
venience to all-is a concept already familiar in our judicial system.
involving judge-shopping, the author contacted ETHICSearch, a division of the A.B.A.'s Center
for Professional Responsibility. The director of ETHICSearch, Peter H. Geraghty, conducted
several search requests in an attempt to locate any cases, decisions, or ethics opinions dealing with
judge-shopping, venue-shopping or forum-shopping. Aside from the cases cited supra note 159,
he found only seven other decisions. Of the seven, five involve the attorney in the Yagman
matter, discussed supra notes 160-61. The sixth decision, In re Discipline of Stuhff, 837 P.2d 853
(Nev. 1992), involves an attorney who was fined and publicly reprimanded for trying to force a
judge's recusal by personally serving the judge, who was in the process of trying the attorney's
client's criminal case, with a judicial complaint. Id. at 854. The seventh decision, Liker v.
Grossman, 573 N.Y.S.2d 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) is the only decision involving venue-
shopping. Although both the attorney and client were fined in that case, the fines were not
specifically related to the client's 20-year battle to seek a forum willing to rule in his favor.
Rather, the court levied the fines in response to the filing of an appeal deemed frivolous and
devoid of merit. Id. at 751. All correspondence between the author and ETHICSearch is on file
with the author.
318. See generally Victor H. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A
Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1980) (arguing
that because Canon 9 is so vague, it is too dangerous); see also Wasserstrom, supra note 196
(arguing that attorneys should be provided with more clarity and guidance than is currently
contained in the ethics rules). Judges are clearly reluctant to find ethics violations for what they
perceive to be litigation strategies. In several cases judges imposed Rule 11 sanctions against
attorneys who law-shopped, but they did not even consider sanctions under the ethics rules. See,
e.g., supra note 297 and accompanying text. Even when a court specifically raises the ethics
issue, further exploration rarely occurs. See Sollenbarger, 706 F. Supp. 776, discussed supra note
315; see also Itei Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc. 108 F.R.D. 96
(D.N.J. 1985), discussed supra note 299. The conduct of the defense attorneys in Itel certainly
violated MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3, which addresses the lawyer's duty of
candor toward the court, as well as MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4, which
addresses the lawyer's duty of fairness to opposing parties and their counsel. Maybe the answer to
why judges are so reluctant to impose sanctions for ethics violations requires exploration of this
question: Can the bar adequately police itself?
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Both traditional and contemporary interpretations of that term-specifi-
cally in the venue context-encompass the very issues relevant to the
mission of finding the most appropriate home of the litigation. Thus, in
lieu of suggesting change in the fifty-plus venue laws currently on the
books, returning to convenience is clearly a workable and viable solu-
tion already at the judicial system's disposal. All that remains is the task
of scrutinizing each venue choice accordingly.
This should not be viewed as an issue of penalizing the filing party
or that party's attorney. It should be viewed as an issue of fairness:
Fairness to the inconvenient forum asked to entertain the matter, fairness
to the jurors of that forum, fairness to any nonfiling parties, and fairness
to any witnesses called to testify. Thus, as once observed, the demands
of justice are not met
whenever a plaintiff can find a forum in which full recovery is per-
mitted, notwithstanding that his or her connection with the chosen
forum is slight. A system of law that maximizes the plaintiff's
recovery is not necessarily a just system of law. [Rather] courts
should be concerned to try cases in "the interests of all the parties and
the ends of justice," and not in the interests of the plaintiff alone.3 9
319. Opeskin, supra note 18, at 22.
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